17 ideas
20728 | Metaphysics is hopeless with its present epistemology; common-sense realism is needed [Colvin] |
20726 | We can only distinguish self from non-self if there is an inflexible external reality [Colvin] |
20727 | Common-sense realism rests on our interests and practical life [Colvin] |
20730 | If objects are doubted because their appearances change, that presupposes one object [Colvin] |
20729 | Arguments that objects are unknowable or non-existent assume the knower's existence [Colvin] |
20731 | The idea that everything is relations is contradictory; relations are part of the concept of things [Colvin] |
14329 | Some dispositional properties (such as mental ones) may have no categorical base [Price,HH] |
9032 | Before we can abstract from an instance of violet, we must first recognise it [Price,HH] |
9034 | There may be degrees of abstraction which allow recognition by signs, without full concepts [Price,HH] |
9035 | If judgement of a characteristic is possible, that part of abstraction must be complete [Price,HH] |
9036 | There is pre-verbal sign-based abstraction, as when ice actually looks cold [Price,HH] |
9037 | Intelligent behaviour, even in animals, has something abstract about it [Price,HH] |
9033 | Recognition must precede the acquisition of basic concepts, so it is the fundamental intellectual process [Price,HH] |
9030 | Abstractions can be interpreted dispositionally, as the ability to recognise or imagine an item [Price,HH] |
9029 | If ideas have to be images, then abstract ideas become a paradoxical problem [Price,HH] |
9031 | The basic concepts of conceptual cognition are acquired by direct abstraction from instances [Price,HH] |
14080 | Are causal descriptions part of the causal theory of reference, or are they just metasemantic? [Kaplan, by Schaffer,J] |