Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Demonstratives', 'Aboutness' and 'Internalism Exposed'

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21 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
18996 A statement S is 'partly true' if it has some wholly true parts [Yablo]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
19006 An 'enthymeme' is an argument with an indispensable unstated assumption [Yablo]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 3. Axioms of Mereology
18999 y is only a proper part of x if there is a z which 'makes up the difference' between them [Yablo]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
19001 'Pegasus doesn't exist' is false without Pegasus, yet the absence of Pegasus is its truthmaker [Yablo]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 3. Mathematical Nominalism
19002 A nominalist can assert statements about mathematical objects, as being partly true [Yablo]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
18998 Parthood lacks the restriction of kind which most relations have [Yablo]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / b. Gettier problem
19004 Gettier says you don't know if you are confused about how it is true [Yablo]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
6871 We can't only believe things if we are currently conscious of their justification - there are too many [Goldman]
6872 Internalism must cover Forgotten Evidence, which is no longer retrievable from memory [Goldman]
6874 Internal justification needs both mental stability and time to compute coherence [Goldman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
6873 Coherent justification seems to require retrieving all our beliefs simultaneously [Goldman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
6875 Reliability involves truth, and truth is external [Goldman]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
19007 A theory need not be true to be good; it should just be true about its physical aspects [Yablo]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / b. Raven paradox
18993 If sentences point to different evidence, they must have different subject-matter [Yablo]
19003 Most people say nonblack nonravens do confirm 'all ravens are black', but only a tiny bit [Yablo]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
18992 Sentence-meaning is the truth-conditions - plus factors responsible for them [Yablo]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
18994 The content of an assertion can be quite different from compositional content [Yablo]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
18997 Truth-conditions as subject-matter has problems of relevance, short cut, and reversal [Yablo]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics
14894 Indexicals have a 'character' (the standing meaning), and a 'content' (truth-conditions for one context) [Kaplan, by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro]
14700 'Content' gives the standard modal profile, and 'character' gives rules for a context [Kaplan, by Schroeter]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
19005 Not-A is too strong to just erase an improper assertion, because it actually reverses A [Yablo]