Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Demonstratives', 'De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence)' and 'The Case for Contextualism'

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22 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 5. Genus and Differentia
13070 If definitions must be general, and general terms can't individuate, then Socrates can't be defined [Aquinas, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
11197 The definitions expressing identity are used to sort things [Aquinas]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / e. Being and nothing
11195 If affirmative propositions express being, we affirm about what is absent [Aquinas]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes
11201 Properties have an incomplete essence, with definitions referring to their subject [Aquinas]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / d. Forms critiques
11205 If the form of 'human' contains 'many', Socrates isn't human; if it contains 'one', Socrates is Plato [Aquinas]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
13090 The principle of diversity for corporeal substances is their matter [Aquinas, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
11202 It is by having essence that things exist [Aquinas]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
11203 Specific individual essence is defined by material, and generic essence is defined by form [Aquinas]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
11200 The definition of a physical object must include the material as well as the form [Aquinas]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
11196 Essence is something in common between the natures which sort things into categories [Aquinas]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
11208 A simple substance is its own essence [Aquinas]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
19513 A contextualist coherentist will say that how strongly a justification must cohere depends on context [DeRose]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism
19514 Classical invariantism combines fixed truth-conditions with variable assertability standards [DeRose]
19515 We can make contextualism more precise, by specifying the discrimination needed each time [DeRose]
19510 In some contexts there is little more to knowledge than true belief. [DeRose]
19516 Contextualists worry about scepticism, but they should focus on the use of 'know' in ordinary speech [DeRose]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / b. Invariantism
19511 If contextualism is about knowledge attribution, rather than knowledge, then it is philosophy of language [DeRose]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
11198 Definition of essence makes things understandable [Aquinas]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
11206 The mind constructs complete attributions, based on the unified elements of the real world [Aquinas]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics
14894 Indexicals have a 'character' (the standing meaning), and a 'content' (truth-conditions for one context) [Kaplan, by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro]
14700 'Content' gives the standard modal profile, and 'character' gives rules for a context [Kaplan, by Schroeter]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
11207 A cause can exist without its effect, but the effect cannot exist without its cause [Aquinas]