15 ideas
10928 | Maybe we can quantify modally if the objects are intensional, but it seems unlikely [Quine] |
10925 | Failure of substitutivity shows that a personal name is not purely referential [Quine] |
10926 | Quantifying into referentially opaque contexts often produces nonsense [Quine] |
10930 | Quantification into modal contexts requires objects to have an essence [Quine] |
14645 | To be necessarily greater than 7 is not a trait of 7, but depends on how 7 is referred to [Quine] |
9201 | Whether 9 is necessarily greater than 7 depends on how '9' is described [Quine, by Fine,K] |
10927 | Necessity only applies to objects if they are distinctively specified [Quine] |
9203 | We can't quantify in modal contexts, because the modality depends on descriptions, not objects [Quine, by Fine,K] |
14080 | Are causal descriptions part of the causal theory of reference, or are they just metasemantic? [Kaplan, by Schaffer,J] |
12163 | Literary meaning emerges in comparisons, and tradition shows which comparisons are relevant [Scruton] |
12162 | In literature, word replacement changes literary meaning [Scruton] |
12159 | Without intentions we can't perceive sculpture, but that is not the whole story [Scruton] |
12160 | In aesthetic interest, even what is true is treated as though it were not [Scruton] |
12161 | We can be objective about conventions, but love of art is needed to understand its traditions [Scruton] |
10931 | We can't say 'necessarily if x is in water then x dissolves' if we can't quantify modally [Quine] |