Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Extrinsic Properties', 'The Central Questions of Philosophy' and 'On the analysis of moral judgements'

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23 ideas

2. Reason / E. Argument / 3. Analogy
You can't infer that because you have a hidden birth-mark, everybody else does [Ayer]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
It is currently held that quantifying over something implies belief in its existence [Ayer]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
Being alone doesn't guarantee intrinsic properties; 'being alone' is itself extrinsic [Lewis, by Sider]
Extrinsic properties come in degrees, with 'brother' less extrinsic than 'sibling' [Lewis]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / b. Individuation by properties
Total intrinsic properties give us what a thing is [Lewis]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
We see properties necessary for a kind (in the definition), but not for an individual [Ayer]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
The theory of other minds has no rival [Ayer]
Originally I combined a mentalistic view of introspection with a behaviouristic view of other minds [Ayer]
Physicalism undercuts the other mind problem, by equating experience with 'public' brain events [Ayer]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 5. Self as Associations
Qualia must be united by a subject, because they lead to concepts and judgements [Ayer]
Is something an 'experience' because it relates to other experiences, or because it relates to a subject? [Ayer]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / a. Self needs body
Bodily identity and memory work together to establish personal identity [Ayer]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
Self-consciousness is not basic, because experiences are not instrinsically marked with ownership [Ayer]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / c. Inadequacy of mental continuity
Temporal gaps in the consciousness of a spirit could not be bridged by memories [Ayer]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Why shouldn't we say brain depends on mind? Better explanation! [Ayer]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
Talk of propositions is just shorthand for talking about equivalent sentences [Ayer]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
Some people think there are ethical facts, but of a 'queer' sort [Ayer]
A right attitude is just an attitude one is prepared to stand by [Ayer]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
Moral theories are all meta-ethical, and are neutral as regards actual conduct [Ayer]
Moral judgements cannot be the logical consequence of a moral philosophy [Ayer]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
I would describe intuitions of good as feelings of approval [Ayer]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
Approval of historical or fictional murders gives us leave to imitate them [Ayer]
Moral judgements are not expressions, but are elements in a behaviour pattern [Ayer]