19 ideas
5331 | You can't infer that because you have a hidden birth-mark, everybody else does [Ayer] |
2611 | It is currently held that quantifying over something implies belief in its existence [Ayer] |
14217 | The 'standard' view of relations is that they hold of several objects in a given order [Fine,K] |
14216 | The 'positionalist' view of relations says the number of places is fixed, but not the order [Fine,K] |
14218 | A block on top of another contains one relation, not both 'on top of' and 'beneath' [Fine,K] |
14219 | Language imposes a direction on a road which is not really part of the road [Fine,K] |
14220 | Explain biased relations as orderings of the unbiased, or the unbiased as permutation classes of the biased? [Fine,K] |
16520 | We see properties necessary for a kind (in the definition), but not for an individual [Ayer] |
2613 | The theory of other minds has no rival [Ayer] |
5328 | Originally I combined a mentalistic view of introspection with a behaviouristic view of other minds [Ayer] |
5330 | Physicalism undercuts the other mind problem, by equating experience with 'public' brain events [Ayer] |
5325 | Is something an 'experience' because it relates to other experiences, or because it relates to a subject? [Ayer] |
5326 | Qualia must be united by a subject, because they lead to concepts and judgements [Ayer] |
5324 | Bodily identity and memory work together to establish personal identity [Ayer] |
5322 | Self-consciousness is not basic, because experiences are not instrinsically marked with ownership [Ayer] |
5327 | Temporal gaps in the consciousness of a spirit could not be bridged by memories [Ayer] |
5329 | Why shouldn't we say brain depends on mind? Better explanation! [Ayer] |
2610 | Talk of propositions is just shorthand for talking about equivalent sentences [Ayer] |
9425 | Lewis later proposed the axioms at the intersection of the best theories (which may be few) [Mumford on Lewis] |