Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Causation', 'Process and Reality' and 'Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic'

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47 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 2. Ancient Philosophy / c. Classical philosophy
European philosophy consists of a series of footnotes to Plato [Whitehead]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / c. Eighteenth century philosophy
My dogmatic slumber was first interrupted by David Hume [Kant]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Metaphysics is generating a priori knowledge by intuition and concepts, leading to the synthetic [Kant]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
With 'extensive connection', boundary elements are not included in domains [Whitehead, by Varzi]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
Mathematics cannot proceed just by the analysis of concepts [Kant]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
Geometry rests on our intuition of space [Kant]
Geometry is not analytic, because a line's being 'straight' is a quality [Kant]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
Numbers are formed by addition of units in time [Kant]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / f. Arithmetic
7+5 = 12 is not analytic, because no analysis of 7+5 will reveal the concept of 12 [Kant]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 2. Intuition of Mathematics
Mathematics can only start from an a priori intuition which is not empirical but pure [Kant]
All necessary mathematical judgements are based on intuitions of space and time [Kant]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
Mathematics cannot be empirical because it is necessary, and that has to be a priori [Kant]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
In Whitehead 'processes' consist of events beginning and ending [Whitehead, by Simons]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
If dispositions are more fundamental than causes, then they won't conceptually reduce to them [Bird on Lewis]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
The substance, once the predicates are removed, remains unknown to us [Kant]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
For true counterfactuals, both antecedent and consequent true is closest to actuality [Lewis]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
'Transcendental' concerns how we know, rather than what we know [Kant]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
I admit there are bodies outside us [Kant]
'Transcendental' is not beyond experience, but a prerequisite of experience [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
A priori synthetic knowledge is only of appearances, not of things in themselves [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
A priori intuitions can only concern the objects of our senses [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 10. A Priori as Subjective
A priori intuition of objects is only possible by containing the form of my sensibility [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
I can make no sense of the red experience being similar to the quality in the object [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / e. Primary/secondary critique
I count the primary features of things (as well as the secondary ones) as mere appearances [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
I can't intuit a present thing in itself, because the properties can't enter my representations [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 4. Pro-Empiricism
Appearance gives truth, as long as it is only used within experience [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
Intuition is a representation that depends on the presence of the object [Kant]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
Determinism says there can't be two identical worlds up to a time, with identical laws, which then differ [Lewis]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts
Some concepts can be made a priori, which are general thoughts of objects, like quantity or cause [Kant]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / b. Propositions as possible worlds
A proposition is a set of possible worlds where it is true [Lewis]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 1. Analytic Propositions
Analytic judgements say clearly what was in the concept of the subject [Kant]
Analytic judgement rests on contradiction, since the predicate cannot be denied of the subject [Kant]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
Whitehead held that perception was a necessary feature of all causation [Whitehead, by Harré/Madden]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
A theory of causation should explain why cause precedes effect, not take it for granted [Lewis, by Field,H]
I reject making the direction of causation axiomatic, since that takes too much for granted [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
It is just individious discrimination to pick out one cause and label it as 'the' cause [Lewis]
The modern regularity view says a cause is a member of a minimal set of sufficient conditions [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
Regularity analyses could make c an effect of e, or an epiphenomenon, or inefficacious, or pre-empted [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
The counterfactual view says causes are necessary (rather than sufficient) for their effects [Lewis, by Bird]
Lewis has basic causation, counterfactuals, and a general ancestral (thus handling pre-emption) [Lewis, by Bird]
Counterfactual causation implies all laws are causal, which they aren't [Tooley on Lewis]
My counterfactual analysis applies to particular cases, not generalisations [Lewis]
One event causes another iff there is a causal chain from first to second [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 9. Counterfactual Claims
Lewis's account of counterfactuals is fine if we know what a law of nature is, but it won't explain the latter [Cohen,LJ on Lewis]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 2. Space
Space must have three dimensions, because only three lines can meet at right angles [Kant]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 3. Points in Space
Whitehead replaced points with extended regions [Whitehead, by Quine]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / a. Absolute time
If all empirical sensation of bodies is removed, space and time are still left [Kant]