33 ideas
19199 | Some say metaphysics is a highly generalised empirical study of objects [Tarski] |
19193 | Disputes that fail to use precise scientific terminology are all meaningless [Tarski] |
19179 | For a definition we need the words or concepts used, the rules, and the structure of the language [Tarski] |
19178 | Definitions of truth should not introduce a new version of the concept, but capture the old one [Tarski] |
19177 | A definition of truth should be materially adequate and formally correct [Tarski] |
19186 | A rigorous definition of truth is only possible in an exactly specified language [Tarski] |
19194 | We may eventually need to split the word 'true' into several less ambiguous terms [Tarski] |
19180 | It is convenient to attach 'true' to sentences, and hence the language must be specified [Tarski] |
19181 | In the classical concept of truth, 'snow is white' is true if snow is white [Tarski] |
19196 | Scheme (T) is not a definition of truth [Tarski] |
19183 | Each interpreted T-sentence is a partial definition of truth; the whole definition is their conjunction [Tarski] |
19182 | Use 'true' so that all T-sentences can be asserted, and the definition will then be 'adequate' [Tarski] |
19198 | We don't give conditions for asserting 'snow is white'; just that assertion implies 'snow is white' is true [Tarski] |
19184 | The best truth definition involves other semantic notions, like satisfaction (relating terms and objects) [Tarski] |
19191 | Specify satisfaction for simple sentences, then compounds; true sentences are satisfied by all objects [Tarski] |
19188 | We can't use a semantically closed language, or ditch our logic, so a meta-language is needed [Tarski] |
19189 | The metalanguage must contain the object language, logic, and defined semantics [Tarski] |
10824 | If listing equivalences is a reduction of truth, witchcraft is just a list of witch-victim pairs [Field,H on Tarski] |
19190 | We need an undefined term 'true' in the meta-language, specified by axioms [Tarski] |
19197 | Truth can't be eliminated from universal claims, or from particular unspecified claims [Tarski] |
19185 | Semantics is a very modest discipline which solves no real problems [Tarski] |
19195 | Truth tables give prior conditions for logic, but are outside the system, and not definitions [Tarski] |
19192 | The truth definition proves semantic contradiction and excluded middle laws (not the logic laws) [Tarski] |
19187 | The Liar makes us assert a false sentence, so it must be taken seriously [Tarski] |
11976 | Aristotelian essentialism says essences are not relative to specification [Lewis] |
11978 | Causal necessities hold in all worlds compatible with the laws of nature [Lewis] |
11979 | It doesn't take the whole of a possible Humphrey to win the election [Lewis] |
16994 | Counterpart theory is bizarre, as no one cares what happens to a mere counterpart [Kripke on Lewis] |
11974 | Counterparts are not the original thing, but resemble it more than other things do [Lewis] |
11975 | If the closest resembler to you is in fact quite unlike you, then you have no counterpart [Lewis] |
11977 | Essential attributes are those shared with all the counterparts [Lewis] |
21862 | Consciousness is based on 'I can', not on 'I think' [Merleau-Ponty] |
20750 | The mind does not unite perceptions, because they flow into one another [Merleau-Ponty] |