10 ideas
18776 | Contextual definitions eliminate descriptions from contexts [Linsky,B] |
18774 | Definite descriptions, unlike proper names, have a logical structure [Linsky,B] |
14664 | Necessary beings (numbers, properties, sets, propositions, states of affairs, God) exist in all possible worlds [Plantinga] |
14666 | Socrates is a contingent being, but his essence is not; without Socrates, his essence is unexemplified [Plantinga] |
14662 | Possible worlds clarify possibility, propositions, properties, sets, counterfacts, time, determinism etc. [Plantinga] |
16472 | Plantinga's actualism is nominal, because he fills actuality with possibilia [Stalnaker on Plantinga] |
16469 | Plantinga has domains of sets of essences, variables denoting essences, and predicates as functions [Plantinga, by Stalnaker] |
16470 | Plantinga's essences have their own properties - so will have essences, giving a hierarchy [Stalnaker on Plantinga] |
14663 | Are propositions and states of affairs two separate things, or only one? I incline to say one [Plantinga] |
9425 | Lewis later proposed the axioms at the intersection of the best theories (which may be few) [Mumford on Lewis] |