Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Subjectivist's Guide to Objective Chance', 'World and Essence' and 'Knowledge:Readings in Cont.Epist'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

22 ideas

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
16435 Plantinga proposes necessary existent essences as surrogates for the nonexistent things [Plantinga, by Stalnaker]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
14655 The 'identity criteria' of a name are a group of essential and established facts [Plantinga]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
14658 'Being Socrates' and 'being identical with Socrates' characterise Socrates, so they are among his properties [Plantinga]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
14656 Does Socrates have essential properties, plus a unique essence (or 'haecceity') which entails them? [Plantinga]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
14654 Properties are 'trivially essential' if they are instantiated by every object in every possible world [Plantinga]
14653 X is essentially P if it is P in every world, or in every X-world, or in the actual world (and not ¬P elsewhere) [Plantinga]
14660 If a property is ever essential, can it only ever be an essential property? [Plantinga]
14661 Essences are instantiated, and are what entails a thing's properties and lack of properties [Plantinga]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
14657 Does 'being identical with Socrates' name a property? I can think of no objections to it [Plantinga]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
14652 'De re' modality is as clear as 'de dicto' modality, because they are logically equivalent [Plantinga]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
14659 We can imagine being beetles or alligators, so it is possible we might have such bodies [Plantinga]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
3756 Perception, introspection, testimony, memory, reason, and inference can give us knowledge [Bernecker/Dretske]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 7. Causal Perception
3757 Causal theory says true perceptions must be caused by the object perceived [Bernecker/Dretske]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
3759 You can acquire new knowledge by exploring memories [Bernecker/Dretske]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
3752 Justification can be of the belief, or of the person holding the belief [Bernecker/Dretske]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
3753 Foundationalism aims to avoid an infinite regress [Bernecker/Dretske]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
3754 Infallible sensations can't be foundations if they are non-epistemic [Bernecker/Dretske]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
3755 Justification is normative, so it can't be reduced to cognitive psychology [Bernecker/Dretske]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
3761 Modern arguments against the sceptic are epistemological and semantic externalism, and the focus on relevance [Bernecker/Dretske]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
3760 Predictions are bound to be arbitrary if they depend on the language used [Bernecker/Dretske]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
3758 Semantic externalism ties content to the world, reducing error [Bernecker/Dretske]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / b. Best system theory
9425 Lewis later proposed the axioms at the intersection of the best theories (which may be few) [Mumford on Lewis]