Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Against Structural Universals', 'Occasions of Identity' and 'Action'

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36 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
15435 If you think universals are immanent, you must believe them to be sparse, and not every related predicate [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
15451 I assume there could be natural properties that are not instantiated in our world [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
15433 Tropes are particular properties, which cannot recur, but can be exact duplicates [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
15436 Universals are meant to give an account of resemblance [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
15438 We can add a primitive natural/unnatural distinction to class nominalism [Lewis]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / b. Cat and its tail
13437 A CAR and its major PART can become identical, yet seem to have different properties [Gallois]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 1. Structure of an Object
15448 The 'magical' view of structural universals says they are atoms, even though they have parts [Lewis]
15449 If 'methane' is an atomic structural universal, it has nothing to connect it to its carbon universals [Lewis]
15439 The 'pictorial' view of structural universals says they are wholes made of universals as parts [Lewis]
15441 The structural universal 'methane' needs the universal 'hydrogen' four times over [Lewis]
15445 Butane and Isobutane have the same atoms, but different structures [Lewis]
15434 Structural universals have a necessary connection to the universals forming its parts [Lewis]
15437 We can't get rid of structural universals if there are no simple universals [Lewis]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
15446 Composition is not just making new things from old; there are too many counterexamples [Lewis]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
15440 A whole is distinct from its parts, but is not a further addition in ontology [Lewis]
15444 Different things (a toy house and toy car) can be made of the same parts at different times [Lewis]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
16233 Gallois hoped to clarify identity through time, but seems to make talk of it impossible [Hawley on Gallois]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
14755 Gallois is committed to identity with respect to times, and denial of simple identity [Gallois, by Sider]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
16231 Occasional Identity: two objects can be identical at one time, and different at others [Gallois, by Hawley]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
15450 Maybe abstraction is just mereological subtraction [Lewis]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
15443 Mathematicians abstract by equivalence classes, but that doesn't turn a many into one [Lewis]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
20014 Actions include: the involuntary, the purposeful, the intentional, and the self-consciously autonomous [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 4. Action as Movement
20019 Maybe bodily movements are not actions, but only part of an agent's action of moving [Wilson/Schpall]
20021 Is the action the arm movement, the whole causal process, or just the trying to do it? [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
20022 To be intentional, an action must succeed in the manner in which it was planned [Wilson/Schpall]
20023 If someone believes they can control the lottery, and then wins, the relevant skill is missing [Wilson/Schpall]
20025 We might intend two ways to acting, knowing only one of them can succeed [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / c. Reducing intentions
20031 On one model, an intention is belief-desire states, and intentional actions relate to beliefs and desires [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / d. Group intentions
20028 Groups may act for reasons held by none of the members, so maybe groups are agents [Wilson/Schpall]
20027 If there are shared obligations and intentions, we may need a primitive notion of 'joint commitment' [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / b. Action cognitivism
20016 Strong Cognitivism identifies an intention to act with a belief [Wilson/Schpall]
20017 Weak Cognitivism says intentions are only partly constituted by a belief [Wilson/Schpall]
20018 Strong Cognitivism implies a mode of 'practical' knowledge, not based on observation [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
20012 Maybe the explanation of an action is in the reasons that make it intelligible to the agent [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
20029 Causalists allow purposive explanations, but then reduce the purpose to the action's cause [Wilson/Schpall]
20013 It is generally assumed that reason explanations are causal [Wilson/Schpall]