47 ideas
6947 | Metaphysics does not rest on facts, but on what we are inclined to believe [Peirce] |
6937 | Reason aims to discover the unknown by thinking about the known [Peirce] |
21122 | Liberal Nationalism says welfare states and democracy needed a shared sense of nationality [Shorten] |
21492 | Realism is basic to the scientific method [Peirce] |
6949 | If someone doubted reality, they would not actually feel dissatisfaction [Peirce] |
9476 | If dispositions are more fundamental than causes, then they won't conceptually reduce to them [Bird on Lewis] |
8425 | For true counterfactuals, both antecedent and consequent true is closest to actuality [Lewis] |
6940 | The feeling of belief shows a habit which will determine our actions [Peirce] |
6941 | We are entirely satisfied with a firm belief, even if it is false [Peirce] |
6942 | We want true beliefs, but obviously we think our beliefs are true [Peirce] |
6943 | A mere question does not stimulate a struggle for belief; there must be a real doubt [Peirce] |
6598 | We need our beliefs to be determined by some external inhuman permanency [Peirce] |
6944 | Demonstration does not rest on first principles of reason or sensation, but on freedom from actual doubt [Peirce] |
6948 | Doubts should be satisfied by some external permanency upon which thinking has no effect [Peirce] |
6945 | Once doubt ceases, there is no point in continuing to argue [Peirce] |
8424 | Determinism says there can't be two identical worlds up to a time, with identical laws, which then differ [Lewis] |
8420 | A proposition is a set of possible worlds where it is true [Lewis] |
21136 | Utilitarians conflate acts and omissions; causing to drown and failing to save are the same [Shorten] |
21135 | There are eight different ways in which groups of people can be oppressed [Shorten, by PG] |
21118 | Constitutional Patriotism unites around political values (rather than national identity) [Shorten] |
21129 | Democracy is a method of selection, or it involves participation, or it concerns public discussion [Shorten] |
21130 | Some say democracy is intrinsically valuable, others that it delivers good outcomes [Shorten] |
21126 | Representative should be either obedient, or sensible, or typical [Shorten] |
21128 | There is 'mirror representation' when the institution statistically reflects the population [Shorten] |
21127 | In a changed situation a Mandated Representative can't keep promises and fight for constituents [Shorten] |
21117 | Liberal citizens have a moral requirement to respect freedom and equality [Shorten] |
21134 | Maybe the rational autonomous liberal individual is merely the result of domination [Shorten] |
21113 | Liberal equality concerns rights, and liberal freedom concerns choice of ends [Shorten] |
21121 | Liberal Nationalism encourages the promotion of nationalistic values [Shorten] |
21115 | Liberalism should not make assumptions such as the value of choosing your own life plan [Shorten] |
21114 | Liberals treat individuals as mutual strangers, rather than as social beings [Shorten] |
21123 | Liberal Nationalism is more communitarian, and Constitutional Patriotism more cosmopolitan [Shorten] |
21124 | Religious toleration has been institutionalised by the separation of church and state [Shorten] |
6939 | What is true of one piece of copper is true of another (unlike brass) [Peirce] |
8405 | A theory of causation should explain why cause precedes effect, not take it for granted [Lewis, by Field,H] |
8427 | I reject making the direction of causation axiomatic, since that takes too much for granted [Lewis] |
10392 | It is just individious discrimination to pick out one cause and label it as 'the' cause [Lewis] |
8419 | The modern regularity view says a cause is a member of a minimal set of sufficient conditions [Lewis] |
8421 | Regularity analyses could make c an effect of e, or an epiphenomenon, or inefficacious, or pre-empted [Lewis] |
17525 | The counterfactual view says causes are necessary (rather than sufficient) for their effects [Lewis, by Bird] |
17524 | Lewis has basic causation, counterfactuals, and a general ancestral (thus handling pre-emption) [Lewis, by Bird] |
8397 | Counterfactual causation implies all laws are causal, which they aren't [Tooley on Lewis] |
8423 | My counterfactual analysis applies to particular cases, not generalisations [Lewis] |
8426 | One event causes another iff there is a causal chain from first to second [Lewis] |
4795 | Lewis's account of counterfactuals is fine if we know what a law of nature is, but it won't explain the latter [Cohen,LJ on Lewis] |
6938 | Natural selection might well fill an animal's mind with pleasing thoughts rather than true ones [Peirce] |
6946 | If death is annihilation, belief in heaven is a cheap pleasure with no disappointment [Peirce] |