41 ideas
| 21122 | Liberal Nationalism says welfare states and democracy needed a shared sense of nationality [Shorten] |
| 9476 | If dispositions are more fundamental than causes, then they won't conceptually reduce to them [Bird on Lewis] |
| 14193 | 'Substance theorists' take modal properties as primitive, without structure, just falling under a sortal [Paul,LA] |
| 14195 | If an object's sort determines its properties, we need to ask what determines its sort [Paul,LA] |
| 14196 | Substance essentialism says an object is multiple, as falling under various different sortals [Paul,LA] |
| 14198 | Absolutely unrestricted qualitative composition would allow things with incompatible properties [Paul,LA] |
| 14190 | Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual [Paul,LA] |
| 14191 | Deep essentialists say essences constrain how things could change; modal profiles fix natures [Paul,LA] |
| 14192 | Essentialism must deal with charges of arbitrariness, and failure to reduce de re modality [Paul,LA] |
| 14197 | An object's modal properties don't determine its possibilities [Paul,LA] |
| 8425 | For true counterfactuals, both antecedent and consequent true is closest to actuality [Lewis] |
| 14189 | 'Modal realists' believe in many concrete worlds, 'actualists' in just this world, 'ersatzists' in abstract other worlds [Paul,LA] |
| 8424 | Determinism says there can't be two identical worlds up to a time, with identical laws, which then differ [Lewis] |
| 8420 | A proposition is a set of possible worlds where it is true [Lewis] |
| 21136 | Utilitarians conflate acts and omissions; causing to drown and failing to save are the same [Shorten] |
| 21135 | There are eight different ways in which groups of people can be oppressed [Shorten, by PG] |
| 21118 | Constitutional Patriotism unites around political values (rather than national identity) [Shorten] |
| 21129 | Democracy is a method of selection, or it involves participation, or it concerns public discussion [Shorten] |
| 21130 | Some say democracy is intrinsically valuable, others that it delivers good outcomes [Shorten] |
| 21126 | Representative should be either obedient, or sensible, or typical [Shorten] |
| 21128 | There is 'mirror representation' when the institution statistically reflects the population [Shorten] |
| 21127 | In a changed situation a Mandated Representative can't keep promises and fight for constituents [Shorten] |
| 21117 | Liberal citizens have a moral requirement to respect freedom and equality [Shorten] |
| 21134 | Maybe the rational autonomous liberal individual is merely the result of domination [Shorten] |
| 21113 | Liberal equality concerns rights, and liberal freedom concerns choice of ends [Shorten] |
| 21121 | Liberal Nationalism encourages the promotion of nationalistic values [Shorten] |
| 21115 | Liberalism should not make assumptions such as the value of choosing your own life plan [Shorten] |
| 21114 | Liberals treat individuals as mutual strangers, rather than as social beings [Shorten] |
| 21123 | Liberal Nationalism is more communitarian, and Constitutional Patriotism more cosmopolitan [Shorten] |
| 21124 | Religious toleration has been institutionalised by the separation of church and state [Shorten] |
| 8405 | A theory of causation should explain why cause precedes effect, not take it for granted [Lewis, by Field,H] |
| 8427 | I reject making the direction of causation axiomatic, since that takes too much for granted [Lewis] |
| 10392 | It is just individious discrimination to pick out one cause and label it as 'the' cause [Lewis] |
| 8419 | The modern regularity view says a cause is a member of a minimal set of sufficient conditions [Lewis] |
| 8421 | Regularity analyses could make c an effect of e, or an epiphenomenon, or inefficacious, or pre-empted [Lewis] |
| 17525 | The counterfactual view says causes are necessary (rather than sufficient) for their effects [Lewis, by Bird] |
| 17524 | Lewis has basic causation, counterfactuals, and a general ancestral (thus handling pre-emption) [Lewis, by Bird] |
| 8397 | Counterfactual causation implies all laws are causal, which they aren't [Tooley on Lewis] |
| 8423 | My counterfactual analysis applies to particular cases, not generalisations [Lewis] |
| 8426 | One event causes another iff there is a causal chain from first to second [Lewis] |
| 4795 | Lewis's account of counterfactuals is fine if we know what a law of nature is, but it won't explain the latter [Cohen,LJ on Lewis] |