60 ideas
11051 | Frege's logical approach dominates the analytical tradition [Hanna] |
11054 | Scientism says most knowledge comes from the exact sciences [Hanna] |
11070 | 'Denying the antecedent' fallacy: φ→ψ, ¬φ, so ¬ψ [Hanna] |
11071 | 'Affirming the consequent' fallacy: φ→ψ, ψ, so φ [Hanna] |
11088 | We can list at least fourteen informal fallacies [Hanna] |
11059 | Circular arguments are formally valid, though informally inadmissible [Hanna] |
11089 | Formally, composition and division fallacies occur in mereology [Hanna] |
11058 | Logic is explanatorily and ontologically dependent on rational animals [Hanna] |
11072 | Logic is personal and variable, but it has a universal core [Hanna] |
21122 | Liberal Nationalism says welfare states and democracy needed a shared sense of nationality [Shorten] |
11061 | Intensional consequence is based on the content of the concepts [Hanna] |
11063 | Logicism struggles because there is no decent theory of analyticity [Hanna] |
11055 | Supervenience can add covariation, upward dependence, and nomological connection [Hanna] |
9476 | If dispositions are more fundamental than causes, then they won't conceptually reduce to them [Bird on Lewis] |
11083 | A sentence is necessary if it is true in a set of worlds, and nonfalse in the other worlds [Hanna] |
11086 | Metaphysical necessity can be 'weak' (same as logical) and 'strong' (based on essences) [Hanna] |
11084 | Logical necessity is truth in all logically possible worlds, because of laws and concepts [Hanna] |
11085 | Nomological necessity is truth in all logically possible worlds with our laws [Hanna] |
8425 | For true counterfactuals, both antecedent and consequent true is closest to actuality [Lewis] |
11077 | Intuition includes apriority, clarity, modality, authority, fallibility and no inferences [Hanna] |
11080 | Intuition is more like memory, imagination or understanding, than like perception [Hanna] |
11078 | Intuition is only outside the 'space of reasons' if all reasons are inferential [Hanna] |
11053 | Explanatory reduction is stronger than ontological reduction [Hanna] |
11081 | Imagination grasps abstracta, generates images, and has its own correctness conditions [Hanna] |
8424 | Determinism says there can't be two identical worlds up to a time, with identical laws, which then differ [Lewis] |
11082 | Should we take the 'depictivist' or the 'descriptivist/propositionalist' view of mental imagery? [Hanna] |
11067 | Rational animals have a normative concept of necessity [Hanna] |
11068 | One tradition says talking is the essence of rationality; the other says the essence is logic [Hanna] |
11047 | Hegelian holistic rationality is the capacity to seek coherence [Hanna] |
11048 | Humean Instrumental rationality is the capacity to seek contingent truths [Hanna] |
11046 | Kantian principled rationality is recognition of a priori universal truths [Hanna] |
11045 | Most psychologists are now cognitivists [Hanna] |
8420 | A proposition is a set of possible worlds where it is true [Lewis] |
21136 | Utilitarians conflate acts and omissions; causing to drown and failing to save are the same [Shorten] |
21135 | There are eight different ways in which groups of people can be oppressed [Shorten, by PG] |
21118 | Constitutional Patriotism unites around political values (rather than national identity) [Shorten] |
21129 | Democracy is a method of selection, or it involves participation, or it concerns public discussion [Shorten] |
21130 | Some say democracy is intrinsically valuable, others that it delivers good outcomes [Shorten] |
21126 | Representative should be either obedient, or sensible, or typical [Shorten] |
21128 | There is 'mirror representation' when the institution statistically reflects the population [Shorten] |
21127 | In a changed situation a Mandated Representative can't keep promises and fight for constituents [Shorten] |
21117 | Liberal citizens have a moral requirement to respect freedom and equality [Shorten] |
21134 | Maybe the rational autonomous liberal individual is merely the result of domination [Shorten] |
21113 | Liberal equality concerns rights, and liberal freedom concerns choice of ends [Shorten] |
21121 | Liberal Nationalism encourages the promotion of nationalistic values [Shorten] |
21115 | Liberalism should not make assumptions such as the value of choosing your own life plan [Shorten] |
21114 | Liberals treat individuals as mutual strangers, rather than as social beings [Shorten] |
21123 | Liberal Nationalism is more communitarian, and Constitutional Patriotism more cosmopolitan [Shorten] |
21124 | Religious toleration has been institutionalised by the separation of church and state [Shorten] |
8405 | A theory of causation should explain why cause precedes effect, not take it for granted [Lewis, by Field,H] |
8427 | I reject making the direction of causation axiomatic, since that takes too much for granted [Lewis] |
10392 | It is just individious discrimination to pick out one cause and label it as 'the' cause [Lewis] |
8419 | The modern regularity view says a cause is a member of a minimal set of sufficient conditions [Lewis] |
8421 | Regularity analyses could make c an effect of e, or an epiphenomenon, or inefficacious, or pre-empted [Lewis] |
17525 | The counterfactual view says causes are necessary (rather than sufficient) for their effects [Lewis, by Bird] |
17524 | Lewis has basic causation, counterfactuals, and a general ancestral (thus handling pre-emption) [Lewis, by Bird] |
8397 | Counterfactual causation implies all laws are causal, which they aren't [Tooley on Lewis] |
8423 | My counterfactual analysis applies to particular cases, not generalisations [Lewis] |
8426 | One event causes another iff there is a causal chain from first to second [Lewis] |
4795 | Lewis's account of counterfactuals is fine if we know what a law of nature is, but it won't explain the latter [Cohen,LJ on Lewis] |