Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Subjectivist's Guide to Objective Chance', 'Eudemian Ethics' and 'A Priori'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


58 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics
After 1903, Husserl avoids metaphysical commitments [Mares]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
Contrary statements can both be reasonable, if they are meant in two different ways [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
The truth of the axioms doesn't matter for pure mathematics, but it does for applied [Mares]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
Mathematics is relations between properties we abstract from experience [Mares]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
The thesis of the Form of the Good (or of anything else) is verbal and vacuous [Aristotle]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
The two right angles of a triangle necessitate that a quadrilateral has four [Aristotle]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 2. A Priori Contingent
Light in straight lines is contingent a priori; stipulated as straight, because they happen to be so [Mares]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
Knowing is having knowledge; understanding is using knowledge [Aristotle]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 6. A Priori from Reason
Aristotelians dislike the idea of a priori judgements from pure reason [Mares]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
Empiricists say rationalists mistake imaginative powers for modal insights [Mares]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
The most popular view is that coherent beliefs explain one another [Mares]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
Operationalism defines concepts by our ways of measuring them [Mares]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
Courage from spirit is natural and unconquerable, as seen in the young [Aristotle]
Whether the mind has parts is irrelevant, since it obviously has distinct capacities [Aristotle]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 3. Constraints on the will
A man is the cause of what is within his power, and what he causes is in his power [Aristotle]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
Only a human being can be a starting point for an action [Aristotle]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / d. Emotional feeling
Some emotional states are too strong for human nature [Aristotle]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / g. Controlling emotions
Nearly all the good and bad states of character are concerned with feelings [Aristotle]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / b. Empirical concepts
Aristotelian justification uses concepts abstracted from experience [Mares]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / c. Classical concepts
The essence of a concept is either its definition or its conceptual relations? [Mares]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
Possible worlds semantics has a nice compositional account of modal statements [Mares]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
Unstructured propositions are sets of possible worlds; structured ones have components [Mares]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
Akrasia is the clash of two feelings - goodness and pleasure [Aristotle]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / a. Acting on beliefs
Choice results when deliberation brings together an opinion with an inclination [Aristotle]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
Unlike in inanimate things, in animate things actions have more than one starting point [Aristotle]
The deliberative part of the soul discerns explanatory causes [Aristotle]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
We are responsible if our actions reflect our motivation [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
An action is voluntary when it is accompanied by thought of some kind [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
Acts are voluntary if done knowingly, by the agent, and in his power to avoid it [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
What is natural for us is either there at birth, or appears by normal processes [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
No one would choose life just for activities not done for their own sake [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / b. Successful function
Wearing a shoe is its intrinsic use, and selling it (as a shoe) is its coincidental use [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / d. Health
Everything seeks, not a single good, but its own separate good [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
We judge people from their deeds because we cannot see their choices (which matter more) [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
Horses, birds and fish are not happy, lacking a divine aspect to their natures [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
Happiness involves three things, of which the greatest is either wisdom, virtue, or pleasure [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
Virtue is different from continence [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
Excellence is the best state of anything (like a cloak) which has an employment or function [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
Character (éthos) is developed from habit (ethos) [Aristotle]
Character virtues (such as courage) are of the non-rational part, which follows the rational part [Aristotle]
Character is shown by what is or is not enjoyed, and virtue chooses the mean among them [Aristotle]
We judge character not by their actions, but by their reasons for actions [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
People sometimes exhibit both extremes together, but the mean is contrary to both of them [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / h. Right feelings
Possessors of a virtue tend to despise what reason shows to be its opposite [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
Greatness of soul produces all the virtues - and vice versa [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / b. Temperance
If someone just looks at or listens to beautiful things, they would not be thought intemperate [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / d. Courage
Courage follows reason, which tells us to choose what is noble [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / e. Honour
Honour depends on what it is for, and whether it is bestowed by worthy people [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / a. External goods
Goods in the soul are more worthy than those outside it, as everybody wants them [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
Decent people can be friends with base people [Aristotle]
Friendship cannot be immediate; it takes time, and needs testing [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
The main function of politics is to produce friendship [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
The best cure for mutual injustice is friendship [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / b. Limited purposes
It is folly not to order one's life around some end [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / c. Purpose denied
Eyes could be used for a natural purpose, or for unnatural seeing, or for a non-seeing activity [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 3. Natural Function
Each thing's function is its end [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / b. Best system theory
Lewis later proposed the axioms at the intersection of the best theories (which may be few) [Mumford on Lewis]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 3. Points in Space
Maybe space has points, but processes always need regions with a size [Mares]