12 ideas
| 14212 | A consistent theory just needs one model; isomorphic versions will do too, and large domains provide those [Lewis] |
| 6402 | In 1927, Russell analysed force and matter in terms of events [Russell, by Grayling] |
| 14213 | Anti-realists see the world as imaginary, or lacking joints, or beyond reference, or beyond truth [Lewis] |
| 14732 | A perceived physical object is events grouped around a centre [Russell] |
| 14733 | An object produces the same percepts with or without a substance, so that is irrelevant to science [Russell] |
| 14210 | A gerrymandered mereological sum can be a mess, but still have natural joints [Lewis] |
| 6418 | Russell rejected phenomenalism because it couldn't account for causal relations [Russell, by Grayling] |
| 14215 | Causal theories of reference make errors in reference easy [Lewis] |
| 14209 | Descriptive theories remain part of the theory of reference (with seven mild modifications) [Lewis] |
| 22439 | There are only duties if there are rights, so truth is only for those with a right to it [Constant] |
| 22440 | Unconditional truth-telling makes a society impossible [Constant] |
| 21706 | At first matter is basic and known by sense-data; later Russell says matter is constructed [Russell, by Linsky,B] |