12 ideas
| 18776 | Contextual definitions eliminate descriptions from contexts [Linsky,B] |
| 18774 | Definite descriptions, unlike proper names, have a logical structure [Linsky,B] |
| 18528 | The single imagined 'interval' between things only exists in the intellect [Auriol] |
| 11976 | Aristotelian essentialism says essences are not relative to specification [Lewis] |
| 11978 | Causal necessities hold in all worlds compatible with the laws of nature [Lewis] |
| 11979 | It doesn't take the whole of a possible Humphrey to win the election [Lewis] |
| 16994 | Counterpart theory is bizarre, as no one cares what happens to a mere counterpart [Kripke on Lewis] |
| 11974 | Counterparts are not the original thing, but resemble it more than other things do [Lewis] |
| 11975 | If the closest resembler to you is in fact quite unlike you, then you have no counterpart [Lewis] |
| 11977 | Essential attributes are those shared with all the counterparts [Lewis] |
| 16589 | Prime matter lacks essence, but is only potentially and indeterminately a physical thing [Auriol] |
| 16651 | God can do anything non-contradictory, as making straightness with no line, or lightness with no parts [Auriol] |