Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Against Structural Universals', 'A Critique of Utilitarianism' and 'Plural Quantification'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


32 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 12. Paraphrase
'Some critics admire only one another' cannot be paraphrased in singular first-order [Linnebo]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
A pure logic is wholly general, purely formal, and directly known [Linnebo]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
Second-order quantification and plural quantification are different [Linnebo]
Traditionally we eliminate plurals by quantifying over sets [Linnebo]
Instead of complex objects like tables, plurally quantify over mereological atoms tablewise [Linnebo]
Plural plurals are unnatural and need a first-level ontology [Linnebo]
Plural quantification may allow a monadic second-order theory with first-order ontology [Linnebo]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
We speak of a theory's 'ideological commitments' as well as its 'ontological commitments' [Linnebo]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
Ordinary speakers posit objects without concern for ontology [Linnebo]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
If you think universals are immanent, you must believe them to be sparse, and not every related predicate [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
I assume there could be natural properties that are not instantiated in our world [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
Tropes are particular properties, which cannot recur, but can be exact duplicates [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
Universals are meant to give an account of resemblance [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
We can add a primitive natural/unnatural distinction to class nominalism [Lewis]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 1. Structure of an Object
The 'magical' view of structural universals says they are atoms, even though they have parts [Lewis]
If 'methane' is an atomic structural universal, it has nothing to connect it to its carbon universals [Lewis]
The 'pictorial' view of structural universals says they are wholes made of universals as parts [Lewis]
The structural universal 'methane' needs the universal 'hydrogen' four times over [Lewis]
Butane and Isobutane have the same atoms, but different structures [Lewis]
Structural universals have a necessary connection to the universals forming its parts [Lewis]
We can't get rid of structural universals if there are no simple universals [Lewis]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
Composition is not just making new things from old; there are too many counterexamples [Lewis]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
A whole is distinct from its parts, but is not a further addition in ontology [Lewis]
Different things (a toy house and toy car) can be made of the same parts at different times [Lewis]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
Maybe abstraction is just mereological subtraction [Lewis]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
Mathematicians abstract by equivalence classes, but that doesn't turn a many into one [Lewis]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
Predicates are 'distributive' or 'non-distributive'; do individuals do what the group does? [Linnebo]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
Maybe the unthinkable is a moral category, and considering some options is dishonourable or absurd [Williams,B]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
Consequentialism assumes that situations can be compared [Williams,B]
For a consequentialist massacring 7 million must be better than massacring 7 million and one [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
We don't have a duty to ensure that others do their duty [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism cannot make any serious sense of integrity [Williams,B]