15 ideas
7557 | To solve Zeno's paradox, reject the axiom that the whole has more terms than the parts [Russell] |
10631 | If 'x is heterological' iff it does not apply to itself, then 'heterological' is heterological if it isn't heterological [Hale/Wright] |
10059 | In mathematic we are ignorant of both subject-matter and truth [Russell] |
7556 | A collection is infinite if you can remove some terms without diminishing its number [Russell] |
10624 | The incompletability of formal arithmetic reveals that logic also cannot be completely characterized [Hale/Wright] |
10629 | If structures are relative, this undermines truth-value and objectivity [Hale/Wright] |
10628 | The structural view of numbers doesn't fit their usage outside arithmetical contexts [Hale/Wright] |
10622 | The neo-Fregean is more optimistic than Frege about contextual definitions of numbers [Hale/Wright] |
14979 | Being alone doesn't guarantee intrinsic properties; 'being alone' is itself extrinsic [Lewis, by Sider] |
15454 | Extrinsic properties come in degrees, with 'brother' less extrinsic than 'sibling' [Lewis] |
10626 | Objects just are what singular terms refer to [Hale/Wright] |
15455 | Total intrinsic properties give us what a thing is [Lewis] |
7554 | Self-evidence is often a mere will-o'-the-wisp [Russell] |
10630 | Abstracted objects are not mental creations, but depend on equivalence between given entities [Hale/Wright] |
10627 | Many conceptual truths ('yellow is extended') are not analytic, as derived from logic and definitions [Hale/Wright] |