10 ideas
| 15545 | Armstrong's analysis seeks truthmakers rather than definitions [Lewis] |
| 15546 | Predications aren't true because of what exists, but of how it exists [Lewis] |
| 15548 | Say 'truth is supervenient on being', but construe 'being' broadly [Lewis] |
| 14399 | Presentism says only the present exists, so there is nothing for tensed truths to supervene on [Lewis] |
| 13365 | Russell's Paradox is a stripped-down version of Cantor's Paradox [Priest,G on Russell] |
| 10711 | Russell's paradox means we cannot assume that every property is collectivizing [Potter on Russell] |
| 15543 | How do things combine to make states of affairs? Constituents can repeat, and fail to combine [Lewis] |
| 9127 | Russell refuted Frege's principle that there is a set for each property [Russell, by Sorensen] |
| 7531 | We don't assert private thoughts; the objects are part of what we assert [Russell] |
| 4001 | The meaning of a word contains all its possible uses as well as its actual ones [Nagel] |