Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Against Structural Universals', 'The Nature of Thought' and 'Rationality and Logic'

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47 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 6. Logical Analysis
Frege's logical approach dominates the analytical tradition [Hanna]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
Scientism says most knowledge comes from the exact sciences [Hanna]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
Full coherence might involve consistency and mutual entailment of all propositions [Blanshard, by Dancy,J]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 1. Fallacy
'Denying the antecedent' fallacy: φ→ψ, ¬φ, so ¬ψ [Hanna]
'Affirming the consequent' fallacy: φ→ψ, ψ, so φ [Hanna]
We can list at least fourteen informal fallacies [Hanna]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 4. Circularity
Circular arguments are formally valid, though informally inadmissible [Hanna]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 5. Fallacy of Composition
Formally, composition and division fallacies occur in mereology [Hanna]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
Coherence tests for truth without implying correspondence, so truth is not correspondence [Blanshard, by Young,JO]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
Logic is explanatorily and ontologically dependent on rational animals [Hanna]
Logic is personal and variable, but it has a universal core [Hanna]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
Intensional consequence is based on the content of the concepts [Hanna]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Logicism struggles because there is no decent theory of analyticity [Hanna]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / b. Types of supervenience
Supervenience can add covariation, upward dependence, and nomological connection [Hanna]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
If you think universals are immanent, you must believe them to be sparse, and not every related predicate [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
I assume there could be natural properties that are not instantiated in our world [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
Tropes are particular properties, which cannot recur, but can be exact duplicates [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
Universals are meant to give an account of resemblance [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
We can add a primitive natural/unnatural distinction to class nominalism [Lewis]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 1. Structure of an Object
The 'magical' view of structural universals says they are atoms, even though they have parts [Lewis]
If 'methane' is an atomic structural universal, it has nothing to connect it to its carbon universals [Lewis]
The 'pictorial' view of structural universals says they are wholes made of universals as parts [Lewis]
The structural universal 'methane' needs the universal 'hydrogen' four times over [Lewis]
Butane and Isobutane have the same atoms, but different structures [Lewis]
Structural universals have a necessary connection to the universals forming its parts [Lewis]
We can't get rid of structural universals if there are no simple universals [Lewis]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
Composition is not just making new things from old; there are too many counterexamples [Lewis]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
A whole is distinct from its parts, but is not a further addition in ontology [Lewis]
Different things (a toy house and toy car) can be made of the same parts at different times [Lewis]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
A sentence is necessary if it is true in a set of worlds, and nonfalse in the other worlds [Hanna]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
Metaphysical necessity can be 'weak' (same as logical) and 'strong' (based on essences) [Hanna]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Logical necessity is truth in all logically possible worlds, because of laws and concepts [Hanna]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
Nomological necessity is truth in all logically possible worlds with our laws [Hanna]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
Intuition includes apriority, clarity, modality, authority, fallibility and no inferences [Hanna]
Intuition is more like memory, imagination or understanding, than like perception [Hanna]
Intuition is only outside the 'space of reasons' if all reasons are inferential [Hanna]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
Explanatory reduction is stronger than ontological reduction [Hanna]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 2. Imagination
Imagination grasps abstracta, generates images, and has its own correctness conditions [Hanna]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
Maybe abstraction is just mereological subtraction [Lewis]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
Should we take the 'depictivist' or the 'descriptivist/propositionalist' view of mental imagery? [Hanna]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
Rational animals have a normative concept of necessity [Hanna]
One tradition says talking is the essence of rationality; the other says the essence is logic [Hanna]
Hegelian holistic rationality is the capacity to seek coherence [Hanna]
Humean Instrumental rationality is the capacity to seek contingent truths [Hanna]
Kantian principled rationality is recognition of a priori universal truths [Hanna]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 1. Psychology
Most psychologists are now cognitivists [Hanna]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
Mathematicians abstract by equivalence classes, but that doesn't turn a many into one [Lewis]