Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Extrinsic Properties', 'The Inessential Indexical' and 'Moral Thinking: Its Levels,Method and Point'

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27 ideas

2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument
18405 A 'teepee' argument has several mutually supporting planks to it [Cappelen/Dever]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
14979 Being alone doesn't guarantee intrinsic properties; 'being alone' is itself extrinsic [Lewis, by Sider]
15454 Extrinsic properties come in degrees, with 'brother' less extrinsic than 'sibling' [Lewis]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / b. Individuation by properties
15455 Total intrinsic properties give us what a thing is [Lewis]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
18422 Prioprioception focuses on your body parts, not on your self, or indexicality [Cappelen/Dever]
18425 We can acquire self-knowledge with mirrors, not just with proprioception and introspection [Cappelen/Dever]
18421 Proprioception is only immune from error if you are certain that it represents the agent [Cappelen/Dever]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
18419 Folk Functionalism is a Ramsification of our folk psychology [Cappelen/Dever]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 9. Indexical Thought
18404 It is assumed that indexical content is needed to represent the perspective of perception [Cappelen/Dever]
18426 All information is objective, and purely indexical information is not much use [Cappelen/Dever]
18427 If some of our thought is tied to its context, it will be hard to communicate it [Cappelen/Dever]
18428 You don't remember your house interior just from an experienced viewpoint [Cappelen/Dever]
18429 Our beliefs and desires are not organised around ourselves, but around the world [Cappelen/Dever]
18407 Indexicality is not significantly connected to agency [Cappelen/Dever]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
18413 Fregeans can't agree on what 'senses' are [Cappelen/Dever]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
18417 Possible worlds accounts of content are notoriously coarse-grained [Cappelen/Dever]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics
18408 Indexicals are just non-constant in meaning, and don't involve any special concepts [Cappelen/Dever]
18414 Fregeans say 'I' differs in reference, so it must also differ in sense [Cappelen/Dever]
18423 All indexicals can be expressed non-indexically [Cappelen/Dever]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / a. Contextual meaning
18406 The basic Kaplan view is that there is truth-conditional content, and contextual character [Cappelen/Dever]
18411 It is proposed that a huge range of linguistic items are context-sensitive [Cappelen/Dever]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / b. Action cognitivism
18420 We deny that action involves some special class of beliefs [Cappelen/Dever]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism
4125 Hare says I acquire an agglomeration of preferences by role-reversal, leading to utilitarianism [Hare, by Williams,B]
4126 If we have to want the preferences of the many, we have to abandon our own deeply-held views [Williams,B on Hare]
4127 If morality is to be built on identification with the preferences of others, I must agree with their errors [Williams,B on Hare]
22483 A judgement is presciptive if we expect it to be acted on [Hare]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 8. Contract Strategies
4360 By far the easiest way of seeming upright is to be upright [Hare]