14 ideas
| 15327 | Kripke's semantic theory has actually inspired promising axiomatic theories [Kripke, by Horsten] |
| 15343 | Kripke offers a semantic theory of truth (involving models) [Kripke, by Horsten] |
| 14966 | The Tarskian move to a metalanguage may not be essential for truth theories [Kripke, by Gupta] |
| 14967 | Certain three-valued languages can contain their own truth predicates [Kripke, by Gupta] |
| 16328 | Kripke classified fixed points, and illuminated their use for clarifications [Kripke, by Halbach] |
| 14775 | Numbers are just names devised for counting [Peirce] |
| 14776 | That two two-eyed people must have four eyes is a statement about numbers, not a fact [Peirce] |
| 14770 | Reasoning is based on statistical induction, so it can't achieve certainty or precision [Peirce] |
| 14774 | Innate truths are very uncertain and full of error, so they certainly have exceptions [Peirce] |
| 14773 | A truth is hard for us to understand if it rests on nothing but inspiration [Peirce] |
| 14772 | If we decide an idea is inspired, we still can't be sure we have got the idea right [Peirce] |
| 14771 | Only reason can establish whether some deliverance of revelation really is inspired [Peirce] |
| 14769 | Only imagination can connect phenomena together in a rational way [Peirce] |
| 9425 | Lewis later proposed the axioms at the intersection of the best theories (which may be few) [Mumford on Lewis] |