29 ideas
| 14782 | Philosophy is an experimental science, resting on common experience [Peirce] |
| 14787 | Self-contradiction doesn't reveal impossibility; it is inductive impossibility which reveals self-contradiction [Peirce] |
| 14783 | Logic, unlike mathematics, is not hypothetical; it asserts categorical ends from hypothetical means [Peirce] |
| 14788 | Mathematics is close to logic, but is even more abstract [Peirce] |
| 9476 | If dispositions are more fundamental than causes, then they won't conceptually reduce to them [Bird on Lewis] |
| 14786 | Some logical possibility concerns single propositions, but there is also compatibility between propositions [Peirce] |
| 8425 | For true counterfactuals, both antecedent and consequent true is closest to actuality [Lewis] |
| 6375 | The taste of chocolate is a 'finer-grained' sensation than the taste of sweetness [Polger] |
| 14789 | Experience is indeed our only source of knowledge, provided we include inner experience [Peirce] |
| 14785 | The world is one of experience, but experiences are always located among our ideas [Peirce] |
| 6381 | The mind and the self are one, and the mind-self is a biological phenomenon [Polger] |
| 8424 | Determinism says there can't be two identical worlds up to a time, with identical laws, which then differ [Lewis] |
| 6378 | Teleological functions explain why a trait exists; causal-role functions say what it does [Polger] |
| 6380 | Identity theory says consciousness is an abstraction: a state, event, process or property [Polger] |
| 8420 | A proposition is a set of possible worlds where it is true [Lewis] |
| 14784 | Ethics is the science of aims [Peirce] |
| 6379 | A mummified heart has the teleological function of circulating blood [Polger] |
| 6377 | Teleological notions of function say what a thing is supposed to do [Polger] |
| 8405 | A theory of causation should explain why cause precedes effect, not take it for granted [Lewis, by Field,H] |
| 8427 | I reject making the direction of causation axiomatic, since that takes too much for granted [Lewis] |
| 10392 | It is just individious discrimination to pick out one cause and label it as 'the' cause [Lewis] |
| 8419 | The modern regularity view says a cause is a member of a minimal set of sufficient conditions [Lewis] |
| 8421 | Regularity analyses could make c an effect of e, or an epiphenomenon, or inefficacious, or pre-empted [Lewis] |
| 17525 | The counterfactual view says causes are necessary (rather than sufficient) for their effects [Lewis, by Bird] |
| 17524 | Lewis has basic causation, counterfactuals, and a general ancestral (thus handling pre-emption) [Lewis, by Bird] |
| 8397 | Counterfactual causation implies all laws are causal, which they aren't [Tooley on Lewis] |
| 8423 | My counterfactual analysis applies to particular cases, not generalisations [Lewis] |
| 8426 | One event causes another iff there is a causal chain from first to second [Lewis] |
| 4795 | Lewis's account of counterfactuals is fine if we know what a law of nature is, but it won't explain the latter [Cohen,LJ on Lewis] |