Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic', 'talk' and 'Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr)'

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33 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Unobservant thinkers tend to dogmatise using insufficient facts [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / c. Potential infinite
Infinity is only potential, never actual [Aristotle]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
Existence is either potential or actual [Aristotle]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
True change is in a thing's logos or its matter, not in its qualities [Aristotle]
A change in qualities is mere alteration, not true change [Aristotle]
If the substratum persists, it is 'alteration'; if it doesn't, it is 'coming-to-be' or 'passing-away' [Aristotle]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
All comings-to-be are passings-away, and vice versa [Aristotle]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 3. Matter of an Object
Matter is the substratum, which supports both coming-to-be and alteration [Aristotle]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
Aristotelian essentialism says essences are not relative to specification [Lewis]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 10. Beginning of an Object
Does the pure 'this' come to be, or the 'this-such', or 'so-great', or 'somewhere'? [Aristotle]
Philosophers have worried about coming-to-be from nothing pre-existing [Aristotle]
The substratum changing to a contrary is the material cause of coming-to-be [Aristotle]
If a perceptible substratum persists, it is 'alteration'; coming-to-be is a complete change [Aristotle]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
Causal necessities hold in all worlds compatible with the laws of nature [Lewis]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
It doesn't take the whole of a possible Humphrey to win the election [Lewis]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
Counterpart theory is bizarre, as no one cares what happens to a mere counterpart [Kripke on Lewis]
Counterparts are not the original thing, but resemble it more than other things do [Lewis]
If the closest resembler to you is in fact quite unlike you, then you have no counterpart [Lewis]
Essential attributes are those shared with all the counterparts [Lewis]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
Behind the bare phenomenal facts there is nothing [Wright,Ch]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary
Which of the contrary features of a body are basic to it? [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / a. Greek matter
Matter is the limit of points and lines, and must always have quality and form [Aristotle]
The primary matter is the substratum for the contraries like hot and cold [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / c. Ultimate substances
There couldn't be just one element, which was both water and air at the same time [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements
The Four Elements must change into one another, or else alteration is impossible [Aristotle]
Fire is hot and dry; Air is hot and moist; Water is cold and moist; Earth is cold and dry [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
Bodies are endlessly divisible [Aristotle]
Wood is potentially divided through and through, so what is there in the wood besides the division? [Aristotle]
If a body is endlessly divided, is it reduced to nothing - then reassembled from nothing? [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / b. Relative time
There is no time without movement [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 2. Eternal Universe
If each thing can cease to be, why hasn't absolutely everything ceased to be long ago? [Aristotle]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
Being is better than not-being [Aristotle]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
An Order controls all things [Aristotle]