10 ideas
18823 | To say there could have been people who don't exist, but deny those possible things, rejects Barcan [Stalnaker, by Rumfitt] |
15533 | We can quantify over fictions by quantifying for real over their names [Lewis] |
15534 | We could quantify over impossible objects - as bundles of properties [Lewis] |
15532 | 'Allists' embrace the existence of all controversial entities; 'noneists' reject all but the obvious ones [Lewis] |
15535 | We can't accept a use of 'existence' that says only some of the things there are actually exist [Lewis] |
16771 | A composite is a true unity if all of its parts fall under one essence [Scheibler] |
16412 | If counterparts exist strictly in one world only, this seems to be extreme invariant essentialism [Stalnaker] |
16409 | Unlike Lewis, I defend an actualist version of counterpart theory [Stalnaker] |
16411 | If possible worlds really differ, I can't be in more than one at a time [Stalnaker] |
16410 | Extensional semantics has individuals and sets; modal semantics has intensions, functions of world to extension [Stalnaker] |