14 ideas
| 18696 | The vagueness of truthmaker claims makes it easier to run anti-realist arguments [Button] |
| 18701 | The coherence theory says truth is coherence of thoughts, and not about objects [Button] |
| 18694 | Permutation Theorem: any theory with a decent model has lots of models [Button] |
| 14592 | Some abstract things have a beginning and end, so may exist in time (though not space) [Swoyer] |
| 14594 | Ontologists seek existence and identity conditions, and modal and epistemic status for a thing [Swoyer] |
| 18692 | Realists believe in independent objects, correspondence, and fallibility of all theories [Button] |
| 18693 | Indeterminacy arguments say if a theory can be made true, it has multiple versions [Button] |
| 18695 | An ideal theory can't be wholly false, because its consistency implies a true model [Button] |
| 14595 | Can properties exemplify other properties? [Swoyer] |
| 14593 | Quantum field theory suggests that there are, fundamentally, no individual things [Swoyer] |
| 18700 | Cartesian scepticism doubts what is true; Kantian scepticism doubts that it is sayable [Button] |
| 18698 | Predictions give the 'content' of theories, which can then be 'equivalent' or 'adequate' [Button] |
| 18697 | A sentence's truth conditions are all the situations where it would be true [Button] |
| 9425 | Lewis later proposed the axioms at the intersection of the best theories (which may be few) [Mumford on Lewis] |