Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Causation', 'Grounding: an opinionated introduction' and 'De Mundo (On the World)'

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21 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
17266 Using modal logic, philosophers tried to handle all metaphysics in modal terms [Correia/Schnieder]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
17263 Why do rationalists accept Sufficient Reason, when it denies the existence of fundamental facts? [Correia/Schnieder]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
16789 Only supernatural means could annihilate anything once it had being [Hobbes]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
17270 Is existential dependence by grounding, or do grounding claims arise from existential dependence? [Correia/Schnieder]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / c. Grounding and explanation
17268 Grounding is metaphysical and explanation epistemic, so keep them apart [Correia/Schnieder]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
17267 The identity of two facts may depend on how 'fine-grained' we think facts are [Correia/Schnieder]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
9476 If dispositions are more fundamental than causes, then they won't conceptually reduce to them [Bird on Lewis]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
8425 For true counterfactuals, both antecedent and consequent true is closest to actuality [Lewis]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
8424 Determinism says there can't be two identical worlds up to a time, with identical laws, which then differ [Lewis]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / b. Propositions as possible worlds
8420 A proposition is a set of possible worlds where it is true [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
8405 A theory of causation should explain why cause precedes effect, not take it for granted [Lewis, by Field,H]
8427 I reject making the direction of causation axiomatic, since that takes too much for granted [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
10392 It is just individious discrimination to pick out one cause and label it as 'the' cause [Lewis]
8419 The modern regularity view says a cause is a member of a minimal set of sufficient conditions [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
8421 Regularity analyses could make c an effect of e, or an epiphenomenon, or inefficacious, or pre-empted [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
17525 The counterfactual view says causes are necessary (rather than sufficient) for their effects [Lewis, by Bird]
17524 Lewis has basic causation, counterfactuals, and a general ancestral (thus handling pre-emption) [Lewis, by Bird]
8397 Counterfactual causation implies all laws are causal, which they aren't [Tooley on Lewis]
8423 My counterfactual analysis applies to particular cases, not generalisations [Lewis]
8426 One event causes another iff there is a causal chain from first to second [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 9. Counterfactual Claims
4795 Lewis's account of counterfactuals is fine if we know what a law of nature is, but it won't explain the latter [Cohen,LJ on Lewis]