Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic', 'Nature and Observability of Causal Relations' and 'Naming and Necessity preface'

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23 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
8368 A correct definition is what can be substituted without loss of meaning [Ducasse]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
16985 Possible worlds allowed the application of set-theoretic models to modal logic [Kripke]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
16982 A man has two names if the historical chains are different - even if they are the same! [Kripke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
11976 Aristotelian essentialism says essences are not relative to specification [Lewis]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
16981 With the necessity of self-identity plus Leibniz's Law, identity has to be an 'internal' relation [Kripke]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
4942 The indiscernibility of identicals is as self-evident as the law of contradiction [Kripke]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
11978 Causal necessities hold in all worlds compatible with the laws of nature [Lewis]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
16984 I don't think possible worlds reductively reveal the natures of modal operators etc. [Kripke]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 2. A Priori Contingent
9385 The very act of designating of an object with properties gives knowledge of a contingent truth [Kripke]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
4943 Instead of talking about possible worlds, we can always say "It is possible that.." [Kripke]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
16983 Probability with dice uses possible worlds, abstractions which fictionally simplify things [Kripke]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
11979 It doesn't take the whole of a possible Humphrey to win the election [Lewis]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
16994 Counterpart theory is bizarre, as no one cares what happens to a mere counterpart [Kripke on Lewis]
11974 Counterparts are not the original thing, but resemble it more than other things do [Lewis]
11975 If the closest resembler to you is in fact quite unlike you, then you have no counterpart [Lewis]
11977 Essential attributes are those shared with all the counterparts [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
8367 Causation is defined in terms of a single sequence, and constant conjunction is no part of it [Ducasse]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation
8372 We see what is in common between causes to assign names to them, not to perceive them [Ducasse]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
8369 Causes are either sufficient, or necessary, or necessitated, or contingent upon [Ducasse]
8373 When a brick and a canary-song hit a window, we ignore the canary if we are interested in the breakage [Ducasse]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
8370 A cause is a change which occurs close to the effect and just before it [Ducasse]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
8371 Recurrence is only relevant to the meaning of law, not to the meaning of cause [Ducasse]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
8374 We are interested in generalising about causes and effects purely for practical purposes [Ducasse]