18 ideas
| 10528 | Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K] |
| 15557 | Verisimilitude has proved hard to analyse, and seems to have several components [Lewis] |
| 13827 | Logical consequence isn't a black box (Tarski's approach); we should explain how arguments work [Prawitz] |
| 13826 | Model theory looks at valid sentences and consequence, but not how we know these things [Prawitz] |
| 10529 | If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K] |
| 10530 | Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K] |
| 15554 | A disposition needs a causal basis, a property in a certain causal role. Could the disposition be the property? [Lewis] |
| 15560 | We can explain a chance event, but can never show why some other outcome did not occur [Lewis] |
| 15559 | Does a good explanation produce understanding? That claim is just empty [Lewis] |
| 15556 | Science may well pursue generalised explanation, rather than laws [Lewis] |
| 15558 | A good explanation is supposed to show that the event had to happen [Lewis] |
| 4809 | Lewis endorses the thesis that all explanation of singular events is causal explanation [Lewis, by Psillos] |
| 14321 | To explain an event is to provide some information about its causal history [Lewis] |
| 10527 | An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K] |
| 15555 | Explaining match lighting in general is like explaining one lighting of a match [Lewis] |
| 15551 | Ways of carving causes may be natural, but never 'right' [Lewis] |
| 15552 | We only pick 'the' cause for the purposes of some particular enquiry. [Lewis] |
| 15553 | Causal dependence is counterfactual dependence between events [Lewis] |