14 ideas
8349 | The best way to do ontology is to make sense of our normal talk [Davidson] |
9456 | Modal logic is multiple systems, shown in the variety of accessibility relations between worlds [Jacquette] |
9457 | The two main views in philosophy of logic are extensionalism and intensionalism [Jacquette] |
9458 | Extensionalists say that quantifiers presuppose the existence of their objects [Jacquette] |
9461 | Intensionalists say meaning is determined by the possession of properties [Jacquette] |
8348 | If we don't assume that events exist, we cannot make sense of our common talk [Davidson] |
8347 | Explanations typically relate statements, not events [Davidson] |
9460 | Extensionalist semantics forbids reference to nonexistent objects [Jacquette] |
9459 | Extensionalist semantics is circular, as we must know the extension before assessing 'Fa' [Jacquette] |
10371 | Distinguish causation, which is in the world, from explanations, which depend on descriptions [Davidson, by Schaffer,J] |
8403 | Either facts, or highly unspecific events, serve better as causes than concrete events [Field,H on Davidson] |
8346 | Full descriptions can demonstrate sufficiency of cause, but not necessity [Davidson] |
4778 | A singular causal statement is true if it is held to fall under a law [Davidson, by Psillos] |
9425 | Lewis later proposed the axioms at the intersection of the best theories (which may be few) [Mumford on Lewis] |