Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Against Structural Universals', 'Brainchildren' and 'Events and Semantic Architecture'

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26 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
15435 If you think universals are immanent, you must believe them to be sparse, and not every related predicate [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
15451 I assume there could be natural properties that are not instantiated in our world [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
15433 Tropes are particular properties, which cannot recur, but can be exact duplicates [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
15436 Universals are meant to give an account of resemblance [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
15438 We can add a primitive natural/unnatural distinction to class nominalism [Lewis]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 1. Structure of an Object
15448 The 'magical' view of structural universals says they are atoms, even though they have parts [Lewis]
15449 If 'methane' is an atomic structural universal, it has nothing to connect it to its carbon universals [Lewis]
15439 The 'pictorial' view of structural universals says they are wholes made of universals as parts [Lewis]
15441 The structural universal 'methane' needs the universal 'hydrogen' four times over [Lewis]
15445 Butane and Isobutane have the same atoms, but different structures [Lewis]
15434 Structural universals have a necessary connection to the universals forming its parts [Lewis]
15437 We can't get rid of structural universals if there are no simple universals [Lewis]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
15446 Composition is not just making new things from old; there are too many counterexamples [Lewis]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
15440 A whole is distinct from its parts, but is not a further addition in ontology [Lewis]
15444 Different things (a toy house and toy car) can be made of the same parts at different times [Lewis]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
2526 Philosophers regularly confuse failures of imagination with insights into necessity [Dennett]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
2523 That every mammal has a mother is a secure reality, but without foundations [Dennett]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
2528 Does consciousness need the concept of consciousness? [Dennett]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / c. Parts of consciousness
2525 Maybe language is crucial to consciousness [Dennett]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
2527 Unconscious intentionality is the foundation of the mind [Dennett]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
15450 Maybe abstraction is just mereological subtraction [Lewis]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
2530 Could a robot be made conscious just by software? [Dennett]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
2524 A language of thought doesn't explain content [Dennett]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / c. Concepts without language
2529 Maybe there can be non-conscious concepts (e.g. in bees) [Dennett]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
15443 Mathematicians abstract by equivalence classes, but that doesn't turn a many into one [Lewis]
19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
21650 No language is semantically referential; it all occurs at the level of thought or utterance [Pietroski, by Hofweber]