20 ideas
17266 | Using modal logic, philosophers tried to handle all metaphysics in modal terms [Correia/Schnieder] |
17263 | Why do rationalists accept Sufficient Reason, when it denies the existence of fundamental facts? [Correia/Schnieder] |
14212 | A consistent theory just needs one model; isomorphic versions will do too, and large domains provide those [Lewis] |
12456 | I aim to establish certainty for mathematical methods [Hilbert] |
12461 | We believe all mathematical problems are solvable [Hilbert] |
12462 | Only the finite can bring certainty to the infinite [Hilbert] |
9633 | No one shall drive us out of the paradise the Cantor has created for us [Hilbert] |
12460 | We extend finite statements with ideal ones, in order to preserve our logic [Hilbert] |
12455 | The idea of an infinite totality is an illusion [Hilbert] |
12457 | There is no continuum in reality to realise the infinitely small [Hilbert] |
12459 | The subject matter of mathematics is immediate and clear concrete symbols [Hilbert] |
18112 | Mathematics divides in two: meaningful finitary statements, and empty idealised statements [Hilbert] |
17270 | Is existential dependence by grounding, or do grounding claims arise from existential dependence? [Correia/Schnieder] |
17268 | Grounding is metaphysical and explanation epistemic, so keep them apart [Correia/Schnieder] |
14213 | Anti-realists see the world as imaginary, or lacking joints, or beyond reference, or beyond truth [Lewis] |
17267 | The identity of two facts may depend on how 'fine-grained' we think facts are [Correia/Schnieder] |
14210 | A gerrymandered mereological sum can be a mess, but still have natural joints [Lewis] |
9636 | My theory aims at the certitude of mathematical methods [Hilbert] |
14215 | Causal theories of reference make errors in reference easy [Lewis] |
14209 | Descriptive theories remain part of the theory of reference (with seven mild modifications) [Lewis] |