9 ideas
14212 | A consistent theory just needs one model; isomorphic versions will do too, and large domains provide those [Lewis] |
7771 | We need 'events' to explain adverbs, which are adjectival predicates of events [Davidson, by Lycan] |
8860 | Language-learning is not good enough evidence for the existence of events [Yablo on Davidson] |
14213 | Anti-realists see the world as imaginary, or lacking joints, or beyond reference, or beyond truth [Lewis] |
15002 | If the best theory of adverbs refers to events, then our ontology should include events [Davidson, by Sider] |
14210 | A gerrymandered mereological sum can be a mess, but still have natural joints [Lewis] |
12583 | Belief truth-conditions are normal circumstances where the belief is supposed to occur [Papineau] |
14215 | Causal theories of reference make errors in reference easy [Lewis] |
14209 | Descriptive theories remain part of the theory of reference (with seven mild modifications) [Lewis] |