14 ideas
11976 | Aristotelian essentialism says essences are not relative to specification [Lewis] |
11993 | Jones may cease to exist without some simple property, but that doesn't make it essential [Kung] |
11997 | A property may belong essentially to one thing and contingently to another [Kung] |
11992 | Aristotelian essences underlie a thing's existence, explain it, and must belong to it [Kung] |
11978 | Causal necessities hold in all worlds compatible with the laws of nature [Lewis] |
11979 | It doesn't take the whole of a possible Humphrey to win the election [Lewis] |
16994 | Counterpart theory is bizarre, as no one cares what happens to a mere counterpart [Kripke on Lewis] |
11974 | Counterparts are not the original thing, but resemble it more than other things do [Lewis] |
11975 | If the closest resembler to you is in fact quite unlike you, then you have no counterpart [Lewis] |
11977 | Essential attributes are those shared with all the counterparts [Lewis] |
11995 | Some peripheral properties are explained by essential ones, but don't themselves explain properties [Kung] |
11996 | Some non-essential properties may explain more than essential-but-peripheral ones do [Kung] |
15160 | Davidson rejected ordinary meaning, and just used truth and reference instead [Davidson, by Soames] |
14612 | Davidson aimed to show that language is structured by first-order logic [Davidson, by Smart] |