Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mad Pain and Martian Pain', 'Action, Reasons and Causes' and 'Elements of Intuitionism'

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14 ideas

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / c. Potential infinite
15938 Platonists ruin infinity, which is precisely a growing structure which is never completed [Dummett]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / a. Constructivism
15939 For intuitionists it is constructed proofs (which take time) which make statements true [Dummett]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / b. Events as primitive
7949 Varied descriptions of an event will explain varied behaviour relating to it [Davidson, by Macdonald,C]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 4. Causal Functionalism
7444 Type-type psychophysical identity is combined with a functional characterisation of pain [Lewis]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
7445 The application of 'pain' to physical states is non-rigid and contingent [Lewis]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
7443 A theory must be mixed, to cover qualia without behaviour, and behaviour without qualia [Lewis, by PG]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 2. Duration of an Action
20020 If one action leads directly to another, they are all one action [Davidson, by Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
20072 We explain an intention by giving an account of acting with an intention [Davidson, by Stout,R]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / a. Acting on beliefs
20045 Acting for a reason is a combination of a pro attitude, and a belief that the action is appropriate [Davidson]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
3395 Davidson claims that what causes an action is the reason for doing it [Davidson, by Kim]
23734 The best explanation of reasons as purposes for actions is that they are causal [Davidson, by Smith,M]
23737 Reasons can give purposes to actions, without actually causing them [Smith,M on Davidson]
20075 Early Davidson says intentional action is caused by reasons [Davidson, by Stout,R]
6664 Reasons must be causes when agents act 'for' reasons [Davidson, by Lowe]