Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Armstrong on combinatorial possibility', 'An essentialist approach to Truth-making' and 'Concerning the Author'

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13 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics
The demonstrations of the metaphysicians are all moonshine [Peirce]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis
Armstrong's analysis seeks truthmakers rather than definitions [Lewis]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
I am saturated with the spirit of physical science [Peirce]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
Propositions are made true, in virtue of something which explains its truth [Lowe]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
Predications aren't true because of what exists, but of how it exists [Lewis]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / d. Being makes truths
Say 'truth is supervenient on being', but construe 'being' broadly [Lewis]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 9. Making Past Truths
Presentism says only the present exists, so there is nothing for tensed truths to supervene on [Lewis]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 9. States of Affairs
How do things combine to make states of affairs? Constituents can repeat, and fail to combine [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes
Modes are beings that are related both to substances and to universals [Lowe]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
Tropes have existence independently of any entities [Lowe]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
Infallibility in science is just a joke [Peirce]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
Association of ideas is the best philosophical idea of the prescientific age [Peirce]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Duns Scotus offers perhaps the best logic and metaphysics for modern physical science [Peirce]