Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic', 'First Things First' and 'Absolute Necessities'

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19 ideas

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
11976 Aristotelian essentialism says essences are not relative to specification [Lewis]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
15086 Absolute necessity might be achievable either logically or metaphysically [Hale]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
8261 Maybe not-p is logically possible, but p is metaphysically necessary, so the latter is not absolute [Hale]
15080 'Relative' necessity is just a logical consequence of some statements ('strong' if they are all true) [Hale]
15081 A strong necessity entails a weaker one, but not conversely; possibilities go the other way [Hale]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
15082 Metaphysical necessity says there is no possibility of falsehood [Hale]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
15085 'Broadly' logical necessities are derived (in a structure) entirely from the concepts [Hale]
15088 Logical necessities are true in virtue of the nature of all logical concepts [Hale]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
11978 Causal necessities hold in all worlds compatible with the laws of nature [Lewis]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
15087 Conceptual necessities are made true by all concepts [Hale]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
11979 It doesn't take the whole of a possible Humphrey to win the election [Lewis]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
16994 Counterpart theory is bizarre, as no one cares what happens to a mere counterpart [Kripke on Lewis]
11974 Counterparts are not the original thing, but resemble it more than other things do [Lewis]
11975 If the closest resembler to you is in fact quite unlike you, then you have no counterpart [Lewis]
11977 Essential attributes are those shared with all the counterparts [Lewis]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / b. Evidentialism
19520 Evidentialism is not axiomatic; the evidence itself inclines us towards evidentialism [Conee]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
19522 More than actual reliability is needed, since I may mistakenly doubt what is reliable [Conee]
19521 If pure guesses were reliable, reliabilists would have to endorse them [Conee]
19523 Reliabilism is poor on reflective judgements about hypothetical cases [Conee]