15 ideas
19044 | Saying truths fit experience adds nothing to truth; nothing makes sentences true [Davidson] |
11976 | Aristotelian essentialism says essences are not relative to specification [Lewis] |
11978 | Causal necessities hold in all worlds compatible with the laws of nature [Lewis] |
11979 | It doesn't take the whole of a possible Humphrey to win the election [Lewis] |
16994 | Counterpart theory is bizarre, as no one cares what happens to a mere counterpart [Kripke on Lewis] |
11974 | Counterparts are not the original thing, but resemble it more than other things do [Lewis] |
11975 | If the closest resembler to you is in fact quite unlike you, then you have no counterpart [Lewis] |
11977 | Essential attributes are those shared with all the counterparts [Lewis] |
6400 | Without the dualism of scheme and content, not much is left of empiricism [Davidson] |
19520 | Evidentialism is not axiomatic; the evidence itself inclines us towards evidentialism [Conee] |
19522 | More than actual reliability is needed, since I may mistakenly doubt what is reliable [Conee] |
19521 | If pure guesses were reliable, reliabilists would have to endorse them [Conee] |
19523 | Reliabilism is poor on reflective judgements about hypothetical cases [Conee] |
6398 | Different points of view make sense, but they must be plotted on a common background [Davidson] |
6399 | Criteria of translation give us the identity of conceptual schemes [Davidson] |