Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic', 'First Things First' and 'Mathematics: Form and Function'

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12 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
18189 ZFC could contain a contradiction, and it can never prove its own consistency [MacLane]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
11976 Aristotelian essentialism says essences are not relative to specification [Lewis]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
11978 Causal necessities hold in all worlds compatible with the laws of nature [Lewis]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
11979 It doesn't take the whole of a possible Humphrey to win the election [Lewis]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
16994 Counterpart theory is bizarre, as no one cares what happens to a mere counterpart [Kripke on Lewis]
11974 Counterparts are not the original thing, but resemble it more than other things do [Lewis]
11975 If the closest resembler to you is in fact quite unlike you, then you have no counterpart [Lewis]
11977 Essential attributes are those shared with all the counterparts [Lewis]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / b. Evidentialism
19520 Evidentialism is not axiomatic; the evidence itself inclines us towards evidentialism [Conee]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
19522 More than actual reliability is needed, since I may mistakenly doubt what is reliable [Conee]
19521 If pure guesses were reliable, reliabilists would have to endorse them [Conee]
19523 Reliabilism is poor on reflective judgements about hypothetical cases [Conee]