12 ideas
10558 | Abstract objects are actually constituted by the properties by which we conceive them [Zalta] |
11976 | Aristotelian essentialism says essences are not relative to specification [Lewis] |
13230 | Particular essence is often captured by generality [Steiner,M] |
11978 | Causal necessities hold in all worlds compatible with the laws of nature [Lewis] |
11979 | It doesn't take the whole of a possible Humphrey to win the election [Lewis] |
16994 | Counterpart theory is bizarre, as no one cares what happens to a mere counterpart [Kripke on Lewis] |
11974 | Counterparts are not the original thing, but resemble it more than other things do [Lewis] |
11975 | If the closest resembler to you is in fact quite unlike you, then you have no counterpart [Lewis] |
11977 | Essential attributes are those shared with all the counterparts [Lewis] |
13229 | Maybe an instance of a generalisation is more explanatory than the particular case [Steiner,M] |
13231 | Explanatory proofs rest on 'characterizing properties' of entities or structure [Steiner,M] |
10557 | Abstract objects are captured by second-order modal logic, plus 'encoding' formulas [Zalta] |