Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Causal Explanation', 'Giordano Bruno and Hermetic Tradition' and 'The Philosophy of Mathematics'

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21 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 4. Early European Thought
9291 The dating, in 1614, of the Hermetic writings as post-Christian is the end of the Renaissance [Yates]
9288 The magic of Asclepius enters Renaissance thought mixed into Ficino's neo-platonism [Yates]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 6. Verisimilitude
15557 Verisimilitude has proved hard to analyse, and seems to have several components [Lewis]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
9193 ZF set theory has variables which range over sets, 'equals' and 'member', and extensionality [Dummett]
9194 The main alternative to ZF is one which includes looser classes as well as sets [Dummett]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
9195 Intuitionists reject excluded middle, not for a third value, but for possibility of proof [Dummett]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
9186 First-order logic concerns objects; second-order adds properties, kinds, relations and functions [Dummett]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
9187 Logical truths and inference are characterized either syntactically or semantically [Dummett]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / c. Priority of numbers
9191 Ordinals seem more basic than cardinals, since we count objects in sequence [Dummett]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
9192 The number 4 has different positions in the naturals and the wholes, with the same structure [Dummett]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
15554 A disposition needs a causal basis, a property in a certain causal role. Could the disposition be the property? [Lewis]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 7. Chance
15560 We can explain a chance event, but can never show why some other outcome did not occur [Lewis]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
15559 Does a good explanation produce understanding? That claim is just empty [Lewis]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
15556 Science may well pursue generalised explanation, rather than laws [Lewis]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / f. Necessity in explanations
15558 A good explanation is supposed to show that the event had to happen [Lewis]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
4809 Lewis endorses the thesis that all explanation of singular events is causal explanation [Lewis, by Psillos]
14321 To explain an event is to provide some information about its causal history [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
15555 Explaining match lighting in general is like explaining one lighting of a match [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
15552 We only pick 'the' cause for the purposes of some particular enquiry. [Lewis]
15551 Ways of carving causes may be natural, but never 'right' [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
15553 Causal dependence is counterfactual dependence between events [Lewis]