15 ideas
19081 | Coherence with a set of propositions suggests we can know the proposition corresponds [Davidson, by Donnellan] |
15533 | We can quantify over fictions by quantifying for real over their names [Lewis] |
15534 | We could quantify over impossible objects - as bundles of properties [Lewis] |
6409 | The 'simple theory of types' distinguishes levels among properties [Ramsey, by Grayling] |
15532 | 'Allists' embrace the existence of all controversial entities; 'noneists' reject all but the obvious ones [Lewis] |
15535 | We can't accept a use of 'existence' that says only some of the things there are actually exist [Lewis] |
8806 | The concepts of belief and truth are linked, since beliefs are meant to fit reality [Davidson] |
3212 | Beliefs are maps by which we steer [Ramsey] |
8252 | Davidson believes experience is non-conceptual, and outside the space of reasons [Davidson, by McDowell] |
8255 | Davidson says the world influences us causally; I say it influences us rationally [McDowell on Davidson] |
8804 | Reasons for beliefs are not the same as evidence [Davidson] |
8802 | Sensations lack the content to be logical; they cause beliefs, but they cannot justify them [Davidson] |
8801 | Coherent justification says only beliefs can be reasons for holding other beliefs [Davidson] |
8805 | Skepticism is false because our utterances agree, because they are caused by the same objects [Davidson] |
18703 | Davidson's Cogito: 'I think, therefore I am generally right' [Davidson, by Button] |