Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Noneism or Allism?', 'The Foundations of Mathematics' and ''Ostrich Nominalism' or 'Mirage Realism'?'

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15 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / f. Axiom of Infinity V
Infinity: there is an infinity of distinguishable individuals [Ramsey]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / p. Axiom of Reducibility
Reducibility: to every non-elementary function there is an equivalent elementary function [Ramsey]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
Either 'a = b' vacuously names the same thing, or absurdly names different things [Ramsey]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
We can quantify over fictions by quantifying for real over their names [Lewis]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
We could quantify over impossible objects - as bundles of properties [Lewis]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 1. Paradox
Contradictions are either purely logical or mathematical, or they involved thought and language [Ramsey]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Formalists neglect content, but the logicists have focused on generalizations, and neglected form [Ramsey]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 7. Formalism
Formalism is hopeless, because it focuses on propositions and ignores concepts [Ramsey]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
'Allists' embrace the existence of all controversial entities; 'noneists' reject all but the obvious ones [Lewis]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
We can't accept a use of 'existence' that says only some of the things there are actually exist [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
Realism doesn't explain 'a is F' any further by saying it is 'a has F-ness' [Devitt]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
The particular/universal distinction is unhelpful clutter; we should accept 'a is F' as basic [Devitt]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta
Quineans take predication about objects as basic, not reference to properties they may have [Devitt]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
I just confront the evidence, and let it act on me [Ramsey]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
A belief is knowledge if it is true, certain and obtained by a reliable process [Ramsey]