67 ideas
| 8927 | Philosophy moves essentially in the element of universality [Hegel] |
| 21776 | Philosophy aims to reveal the necessity and rationality of the categories of nature and spirit [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| 7950 | Philosophy tries to explain how the actual is possible, given that it seems impossible [Macdonald,C] |
| 7923 | 'Did it for the sake of x' doesn't involve a sake, so how can ontological commitments be inferred? [Macdonald,C] |
| 8935 | Without philosophy, science is barren and futile [Hegel] |
| 22082 | Truth does not appear by asserting reasons and then counter-reasons [Hegel] |
| 22035 | The structure of reason is a social and historical achievement [Hegel, by Pinkard] |
| 8932 | Truth does not come from giving reasons for and against propositions [Hegel] |
| 7933 | Don't assume that a thing has all the properties of its parts [Macdonald,C] |
| 7077 | The true is the whole [Hegel] |
| 7944 | Reduce by bridge laws (plus property identities?), by elimination, or by reducing talk [Macdonald,C] |
| 7938 | Relational properties are clearly not essential to substances [Macdonald,C] |
| 7967 | Being taller is an external relation, but properties and substances have internal relations [Macdonald,C] |
| 7965 | Does the knowledge of each property require an infinity of accompanying knowledge? [Macdonald,C] |
| 7934 | Tropes are abstract (two can occupy the same place), but not universals (they have locations) [Macdonald,C] |
| 7958 | Properties are sets of exactly resembling property-particulars [Macdonald,C] |
| 7972 | Tropes are abstract particulars, not concrete particulars, so the theory is not nominalist [Macdonald,C] |
| 7959 | How do a group of resembling tropes all resemble one another in the same way? [Macdonald,C] |
| 7960 | Trope Nominalism is the only nominalism to introduce new entities, inviting Ockham's Razor [Macdonald,C] |
| 7951 | Numerical sameness is explained by theories of identity, but what explains qualitative identity? [Macdonald,C] |
| 7964 | How can universals connect instances, if they are nothing like them? [Macdonald,C] |
| 7971 | Real Nominalism is only committed to concrete particulars, word-tokens, and (possibly) sets [Macdonald,C] |
| 7955 | Resemblance Nominalism cannot explain either new resemblances, or absence of resemblances [Macdonald,C] |
| 7961 | A 'thing' cannot be in two places at once, and two things cannot be in the same place at once [Macdonald,C] |
| 7926 | We 'individuate' kinds of object, and 'identify' particular specimens [Macdonald,C] |
| 7936 | Unlike bundles of properties, substances have an intrinsic unity [Macdonald,C] |
| 7930 | The bundle theory of substance implies the identity of indiscernibles [Macdonald,C] |
| 7932 | A phenomenalist cannot distinguish substance from attribute, so must accept the bundle view [Macdonald,C] |
| 7937 | When we ascribe a property to a substance, the bundle theory will make that a tautology [Macdonald,C] |
| 7939 | Substances persist through change, but the bundle theory says they can't [Macdonald,C] |
| 7940 | A substance might be a sequence of bundles, rather than a single bundle [Macdonald,C] |
| 7948 | A statue and its matter have different persistence conditions, so they are not identical [Macdonald,C] |
| 7929 | A substance is either a bundle of properties, or a bare substratum, or an essence [Macdonald,C] |
| 7941 | Each substance contains a non-property, which is its substratum or bare particular [Macdonald,C] |
| 7942 | The substratum theory explains the unity of substances, and their survival through change [Macdonald,C] |
| 7943 | A substratum has the quality of being bare, and they are useless because indiscernible [Macdonald,C] |
| 11976 | Aristotelian essentialism says essences are not relative to specification [Lewis] |
| 7927 | At different times Leibniz articulated three different versions of his so-called Law [Macdonald,C] |
| 7928 | The Identity of Indiscernibles is false, because it is not necessarily true [Macdonald,C] |
| 11978 | Causal necessities hold in all worlds compatible with the laws of nature [Lewis] |
| 11979 | It doesn't take the whole of a possible Humphrey to win the election [Lewis] |
| 16994 | Counterpart theory is bizarre, as no one cares what happens to a mere counterpart [Kripke on Lewis] |
| 11974 | Counterparts are not the original thing, but resemble it more than other things do [Lewis] |
| 11975 | If the closest resembler to you is in fact quite unlike you, then you have no counterpart [Lewis] |
| 11977 | Essential attributes are those shared with all the counterparts [Lewis] |
| 15611 | I develop philosophical science from the simplest appearance of immediate consciousness [Hegel, by Hegel] |
| 8928 | The Absolute is not supposed to be comprehended, but felt and intuited [Hegel] |
| 8929 | In the Absolute everything is the same [Hegel] |
| 21774 | Genuine idealism is seeing the ideal structure of the world [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| 8934 | Being is Thought [Hegel] |
| 21773 | Experience is immediacy, unity, forces, self-awareness, reason, culture, absolute being [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| 22033 | Hegel tried to avoid Kant's dualism of neutral intuitions and imposed concepts [Hegel, by Pinkard] |
| 21771 | Consciousness derives its criterion of knowledge from direct knowledge of its own being [Hegel] |
| 20741 | Consciousness is shaped dialectically, by opposing forces and concepts [Hegel, by Aho] |
| 21770 | Consciousness is both of objects, and of itself [Hegel] |
| 5647 | Hegel claims knowledge of self presupposes desire, and hence objects [Hegel, by Scruton] |
| 7947 | In continuity, what matters is not just the beginning and end states, but the process itself [Macdonald,C] |
| 5648 | For Hegel knowledge of self presupposes objects, and also a public and moral social world [Hegel, by Scruton] |
| 8930 | The in-itself must become for-itself, which requires self-consciousness [Hegel] |
| 8936 | Human nature only really exists in an achieved community of minds [Hegel] |
| 22034 | Modern life needs individuality, but must recognise that human agency is social [Hegel, by Pinkard] |
| 21987 | History is the progress of the consciousness of freedom [Hegel] |
| 8931 | The movement of pure essences constitutes the nature of scientific method [Hegel] |
| 8933 | Science confronts the inner necessities of objects [Hegel] |
| 21775 | The God of revealed religion can only be understood through pure speculative knowledge [Hegel] |
| 6917 | God is the essence of thought, abstracted from the thinker [Hegel, by Feuerbach] |
| 6915 | Hegel made the last attempt to restore Christianity, which philosophy had destroyed [Hegel, by Feuerbach] |