13 ideas
| 21753 | If we look at the world rationally, the world assumes a rational aspect [Hegel] |
| 20728 | Metaphysics is hopeless with its present epistemology; common-sense realism is needed [Colvin] |
| 15545 | Armstrong's analysis seeks truthmakers rather than definitions [Lewis] |
| 21974 | The world seems rational to those who look at it rationally [Hegel] |
| 15546 | Predications aren't true because of what exists, but of how it exists [Lewis] |
| 15548 | Say 'truth is supervenient on being', but construe 'being' broadly [Lewis] |
| 14399 | Presentism says only the present exists, so there is nothing for tensed truths to supervene on [Lewis] |
| 20726 | We can only distinguish self from non-self if there is an inflexible external reality [Colvin] |
| 20727 | Common-sense realism rests on our interests and practical life [Colvin] |
| 20729 | Arguments that objects are unknowable or non-existent assume the knower's existence [Colvin] |
| 20730 | If objects are doubted because their appearances change, that presupposes one object [Colvin] |
| 20731 | The idea that everything is relations is contradictory; relations are part of the concept of things [Colvin] |
| 15543 | How do things combine to make states of affairs? Constituents can repeat, and fail to combine [Lewis] |