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All the ideas for 'Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic', 'works' and 'Epistemic Injustice'

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20 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 2. History of Logic
11022 Gentzen introduced a natural deduction calculus (NK) in 1934 [Gentzen, by Read]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
11065 The inferential role of a logical constant constitutes its meaning [Gentzen, by Hanna]
11023 The logical connectives are 'defined' by their introduction rules [Gentzen]
11213 Each logical symbol has an 'introduction' rule to define it, and hence an 'elimination' rule [Gentzen]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
10067 Gentzen proved the consistency of arithmetic from assumptions beyond arithmetic [Gentzen, by Musgrave]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
11976 Aristotelian essentialism says essences are not relative to specification [Lewis]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
11978 Causal necessities hold in all worlds compatible with the laws of nature [Lewis]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
11979 It doesn't take the whole of a possible Humphrey to win the election [Lewis]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
16994 Counterpart theory is bizarre, as no one cares what happens to a mere counterpart [Kripke on Lewis]
11974 Counterparts are not the original thing, but resemble it more than other things do [Lewis]
11975 If the closest resembler to you is in fact quite unlike you, then you have no counterpart [Lewis]
11977 Essential attributes are those shared with all the counterparts [Lewis]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
23551 It is necessary for a belief that it be held for a length of time [Fricker,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 1. Epistemic virtues
23558 Offering knowledge needs accuracy and sincerity; receiving it needs testimonial justice [Fricker,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 7. Testimony
23550 Burge says we are normally a priori entitled to believe testimony [Fricker,M]
23552 We assess testimonial probabilities by the speaker, the listener, the facts, and the circumstances [Fricker,M]
23553 Testimonial judgement is not logical, but produces reasons and motivations [Fricker,M]
23555 Assessing credibility involves the impact of both the speaker's and the listener's social identity [Fricker,M]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
23554 Judgements can be unreflective and non-inferential, yet rational, by being sensitive to experience [Fricker,M]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
23557 To judge agents in remote times and cultures we need a moral resentment weaker than blame [Fricker,M]