48 ideas
6961 | An analogy begins to break down as soon as the two cases differ [Hume] |
9476 | If dispositions are more fundamental than causes, then they won't conceptually reduce to them [Bird on Lewis] |
12756 | Substance is a force for acting and being acted upon [Leibniz] |
8425 | For true counterfactuals, both antecedent and consequent true is closest to actuality [Lewis] |
21285 | Events are baffling before experience, and obvious after experience [Hume] |
12755 | Final causes can help with explanations in physics [Leibniz] |
8424 | Determinism says there can't be two identical worlds up to a time, with identical laws, which then differ [Lewis] |
12760 | Something rather like souls (though not intelligent) could be found everywhere [Leibniz] |
8420 | A proposition is a set of possible worlds where it is true [Lewis] |
12759 | There are atoms of substance, but no atoms of bulk or extension [Leibniz] |
12718 | Secondary matter is active and complete; primary matter is passive and incomplete [Leibniz] |
8405 | A theory of causation should explain why cause precedes effect, not take it for granted [Lewis, by Field,H] |
8427 | I reject making the direction of causation axiomatic, since that takes too much for granted [Lewis] |
10392 | It is just individious discrimination to pick out one cause and label it as 'the' cause [Lewis] |
8419 | The modern regularity view says a cause is a member of a minimal set of sufficient conditions [Lewis] |
8421 | Regularity analyses could make c an effect of e, or an epiphenomenon, or inefficacious, or pre-empted [Lewis] |
17525 | The counterfactual view says causes are necessary (rather than sufficient) for their effects [Lewis, by Bird] |
17524 | Lewis has basic causation, counterfactuals, and a general ancestral (thus handling pre-emption) [Lewis, by Bird] |
8397 | Counterfactual causation implies all laws are causal, which they aren't [Tooley on Lewis] |
8423 | My counterfactual analysis applies to particular cases, not generalisations [Lewis] |
8426 | One event causes another iff there is a causal chain from first to second [Lewis] |
11854 | If there is some trace of God in things, that would explain their natural force [Leibniz] |
4795 | Lewis's account of counterfactuals is fine if we know what a law of nature is, but it won't explain the latter [Cohen,LJ on Lewis] |
12758 | It is plausible to think substances contain the same immanent force seen in our free will [Leibniz] |
6959 | We can't assume God's perfections are like our ideas or like human attributes [Hume] |
6957 | The objects of theological reasoning are too big for our minds [Hume] |
21255 | No being's non-existence can imply a contradiction, so its existence cannot be proved a priori [Hume] |
21254 | A chain of events requires a cause for the whole as well as the parts, yet the chain is just a sum of parts [Hume] |
1435 | If something must be necessary so that something exists rather than nothing, why can't the universe be necessary? [Hume] |
6962 | The thing which contains order must be God, so see God where you see order [Hume] |
6960 | Analogy suggests that God has a very great human mind [Hume] |
6958 | How can we pronounce on a whole after a brief look at a very small part? [Hume] |
21279 | If the divine cause is proportional to its effects, the effects are finite, so the Deity cannot be infinite [Hume] |
21282 | Design cannot prove a unified Deity. Many men make a city, so why not many gods for a world? [Hume] |
21280 | From a ship you would judge its creator a genius, not a mere humble workman [Hume] |
6966 | Creation is more like vegetation than human art, so it won't come from reason [Hume] |
21281 | This excellent world may be the result of a huge sequence of trial-and-error [Hume] |
21283 | Humans renew their species sexually. If there are many gods, would they not do the same? [Hume] |
21284 | This Creator god might be an infant or incompetent or senile [Hume] |
6967 | Order may come from an irrational source as well as a rational one [Hume] |
21286 | Motion often begins in matter, with no sign of a controlling agent [Hume] |
21287 | The universe could settle into superficial order, without a designer [Hume] |
21288 | Ideas arise from objects, not vice versa; ideas only influence matter if they are linked [Hume] |
21256 | A surprise feature of all products of 9 looks like design, but is actually a necessity [Hume] |
6965 | The universe may be the result of trial-and-error [Hume] |
6964 | From our limited view, we cannot tell if the universe is faulty [Hume] |
6963 | Why would we infer an infinite creator from a finite creation? [Hume] |
19408 | To say that nature or the one universal substance is God is a pernicious doctrine [Leibniz] |