9 ideas
| 15545 | Armstrong's analysis seeks truthmakers rather than definitions [Lewis] |
| 15546 | Predications aren't true because of what exists, but of how it exists [Lewis] |
| 15548 | Say 'truth is supervenient on being', but construe 'being' broadly [Lewis] |
| 14399 | Presentism says only the present exists, so there is nothing for tensed truths to supervene on [Lewis] |
| 8921 | Structuralism is now common, studying relations, with no regard for what the objects might be [Hellman] |
| 8922 | Maybe mathematical objects only have structural roles, and no intrinsic nature [Hellman] |
| 15543 | How do things combine to make states of affairs? Constituents can repeat, and fail to combine [Lewis] |
| 12712 | Substance is that which can act [Leibniz] |
| 12737 | Nature can be fully explained by final causes alone, or by efficient causes alone [Leibniz] |