11 ideas
9161 | Maybe reasonableness requires circular justifications - that is one coherentist view [Field,H] |
12741 | If experience is just a dream, it is still real enough if critical reason is never deceived [Leibniz] |
12740 | The strongest criterion that phenomena show reality is success in prediction [Leibniz] |
9160 | Lots of propositions are default reasonable, but the a priori ones are empirically indefeasible [Field,H] |
9164 | We treat basic rules as if they were indefeasible and a priori, with no interest in counter-evidence [Field,H] |
12721 | Light, heat and colour are apparent qualities, and so are motion, figure and extension [Leibniz] |
9165 | Reliability only makes a rule reasonable if we place a value on the truth produced by reliable processes [Field,H] |
9162 | Believing nothing, or only logical truths, is very reliable, but we want a lot more than that [Field,H] |
9166 | People vary in their epistemological standards, and none of them is 'correct' [Field,H] |
9163 | If we only use induction to assess induction, it is empirically indefeasible, and hence a priori [Field,H] |
9425 | Lewis later proposed the axioms at the intersection of the best theories (which may be few) [Mumford on Lewis] |